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Managers’ pay, and the way it is determined, can have an important impact
on the success of firms, and even of whole economies. While there is a rich
literature exploring these issues in the for-profit sector, managerial pay at
nonprofit firms has received little attention. Yet nonprofit organizations suffer
from agency problems that are similar to, or perhaps even more severe than,
those observed at for-profit companies. Accordingly, this Article explores the
implications for nonprofit governance of a world in which “managerial
power” can affect nonprofit pay setting. This Article develops the theory and
provides support in the form of original empirical evidence based on data from
a large panel of colleges and universities collected across a ten-year period.
Our findings support the hypothesis that donors with less leverage suffer from
significant agency costs in setting president pay. For example, we find for the
first time evidence of an otherwise counterintuitive negative association
between the fraction of university revenue provided by current donations and
president compensation, which we suggest shows that schools that are less
dependent on donors are freer to set high pay. We discuss the implications of
these findings for the regulation of nonprofits and for a broader understanding
of the pay-setting process at for-profit as well as nonprofit organizations.
INTRODUCTION
Why is higher education so expensive? In the decade between 1997 and
2007, net tuition and fees per student—that is, the price tag for a degree, even
after financial aid—at 387 selective private colleges and universities rose by
more than 26% in real, inflation-adjusted dollars.1 The situation today is so
critical that the U.S. Department of Education reportedly is considering direct
1

Authors’ calculation based on data collected from the National Center for Education
Statistics. For additional detail, see U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY WITH U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
THE ECONOMICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 18-24 (2012).
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regulation of private education pricing.2 Governmental command and control
is certainly one option for correcting failing markets, but often a more effective
alternative is to understand the motives of the individual humans who are at
work, and then to more subtly align their incentives with the best policies.3 For
example, many recent commentators have pointed to executive pay reform as a
possible solution to the banking-system problems that led to the 2007-08
financial crisis.4
In this regard, it is hard to overlook the fact that the compensation of the
presidents of private U.S. colleges and universities has also risen at a rapid clip
over the past fifteen years. In the same decade between 1997 and 2007,
average president pay at the same 387 schools increased by 50% in real terms,
far outpacing gains in overall university expenditures.5 In 2011, 42 private
university presidents received pay packages in excess of one million dollars.6
In this Article we argue that growth in tuition and compensation are
potentially related phenomena, and report new evidence in support of our
theory. In our view, both are products of agency problems of the kind familiar
to most observers of large for-profit firms.7 Opportunities to draw higher pay,
or the need to justify outsize reward packages, may drive decisions about how
to fund the university or how selective to be with the student body. We test our
hypothesis by studying the statistical relationships between pay, institutional
outcomes such as tuition, and the relative significance of university donors
who might be expected to monitor how presidents perform and are paid.
Although we’ll report several possible interpretations of our findings, we
suggest that each of them implies that rules of executive compensation and
2

See Scott Jaschik, Obama’s Ratings for Higher Ed, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 22, 2013,
3:44 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/4MZE-VDAB.
3 Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 806-09 (2012);
Cameron Hepburn, Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or Both: A Review of Instrument
Choice, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 226, 228-29 (2006).
4 E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247, 250-51 (2010); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporate Governance and Executive
Compensation in Financial Firms, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 834, 838-50; Frederick Tung,
Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2011).
5
Authors’ calculation based on data collected from the National Center for Education
Statistics. See also infra Part III.A (charting an increase in average president pay using a
sample of 341 colleges and universities and comparing that increase to other university
expenses).
6 Jonah Newman & Brian O’Leary, Executive Compensation at Private Colleges, 2011,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 15, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/G22J-CDN5.
7 Agency costs arise when stakeholders or principals must rely on imperfectly controlled
managers or “agents”—who do not always act in the best interest of the stakeholders—for
direction of the organization. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
308-10 (1976).
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nonprofit governance could be important levers for improving education
policy.
Prior commentators have missed these connections because the agency cost
story of executive compensation has focused on the for-profit sector and, in
large part, on executive pay at publicly traded companies.8 There has been
relatively little research on executive pay in the nonprofit sector.9
Commentators recognize that agency problems exist in the nonprofit sphere,
allowing managers to run organizations in ways donors or other stakeholders
might not approve.10 But while managers may make some choices donors
8

The literature is both voluminous and highly interdisciplinary. Important contributions
have come from law, economics, corporate finance, and accounting, among other fields.
Surveys include John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A
Survey, ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27; Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO
Compensation, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 75 (2010); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive
Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2508-10 (Orley Ashenfelter
& David Card eds., 1999); and David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive
Compensation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 232
(Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
There is also an emerging literature on executive pay in the private equity/venture capital
arena. See Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Private Equity and Executive Compensation, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 638 (2013); Phillip Leslie & Paul Oyer, Managerial Incentives and Value Creation:
Evidence from Private Equity 8 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/oyer/wp/pe.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QE77-2JBF.
9 See Kevin F. Hallock, Managerial Pay and Governance in American Nonprofits, 41
IND. REL. 377, 404 (2002) (“[L]ittle is known about the compensation of managers of
nonprofits from an empirical point of view.”). For prior discussions of the dynamics of
nonprofit compensation in the legal literature, see generally Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the
21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 37-38 (2011); Peter Frumkin &
Alice Andre-Clark, Nonprofit Compensation and the Market, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 425
(1999); Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Executive Compensation Dilemmas in Tax-Exempt
Organizations: Reasonableness, Comparability, and Disclosure, 71 TUL. L. REV. 819
(1997); Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 819, 868-76 (2012); Evelyn A. Lewis, Charitable Waste: Consideration of a “Waste
Not, Want Not” Tax, 30 VA. TAX REV. 39 (2010). Of these, only Leff addresses agency costs
at all, and his focus is on the extent to which paying managers with a share of firm profits
would increase agency costs for donors. Leff, supra, at 870. A few non-legal sources briefly
connect managerial pay at nonprofits to possible agency costs but do not analyze the
situation in any depth. See, e.g., James A. Brickley & R. Lawrence van Horn, Managerial
Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals, 45 J.L. & ECON. 227, 228
n.4 (2002) (noting that high executive pay at nonprofits could be a sign of agency costs).
10 E.g., Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 843-51
(1980); M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for
Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 598-600 (2009); Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit
Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 159 (2007); Robert A. Katz, Can PrincipalAgent Models Help Explain Charitable Gifts and Organizations?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1, 4-6;
Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 227, 230-36; Mark Pauly & Michael Redisch, The Not-for-Profit Hospital as a
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would not, the dominant view is that nonprofit managers can largely be trusted
not to overpay themselves, because they are committed to their cause, and
because monitoring by nonprofit boards and peers is effective at constraining
any excessive compensation.11 Perhaps as a result, to our knowledge no prior
work considers what should become of nonprofit law in a world in which
managerial pay, too, is subject to serious agency problems.12
In contrast, the relationship between managerial agency problems and forprofit executive pay has been a central focus of academic research over the last
several decades.13 A key question has been whether pay practices reflect
agency problems or mitigate those problems or both.14 One school of thought

Physicians’ Cooperative, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 87 (1973); Usha Rodrigues, Entity and
Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1267-71 (2011). For a review, see Marc Jegers, “Corporate”
Governance in Nonprofit Organizations, 20 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 143, 145-59
(2009). Empirical evidence on this point includes Core, Guay, and Verdi, who find evidence
that nonprofits’ build-up of endowments may serve managerial interests, see John E. Core et
al., Agency Problems of Excess Endowment Holdings in Not-for-Profit Firms, 41 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 307, 309 (2006), and Klick & Sitkoff, who find that markets appear to view
charitable trusts as less reliable custodians of shareholder value than for-profit corporations,
Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate
Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 816 (2008).
11 See, e.g., MARC JEGERS, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS OF NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS 5960 (2008); Ralf Caers et al., Principal-Agent Relationships on the Stewardship-Agency Axis,
17 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 25, 28-31, 33-34 (2006) (explaining this theory and
citing evidence that it seems to guide nonprofit boards); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 318-19 (1983)
[hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Separation]; Gregory O. Jobome, Management Pay,
Governance and Performance: The Case of Large UK Nonprofits, 22 FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY
& MGMT. 331, 334 (2006); Bruce R. Kingma, Public Good Theories of the Nonprofit
Sector: Weisbrod Revisited, 8 VOLUNTAS 135, 142 (1997). In the case of universities, Fama
& Jensen argue that internal monitoring by other constituencies, such as faculty, and outside
reviewers allow inexpert donors to effectively oversee presidents and other top
management. Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra, at 321. We are not aware of any
significant evidence to support these claims. See infra Part I.B.
12 However, as we will explain, some earlier findings can be explained through that lens.
E.g., Edward A. Dyl et al., Governance and Funds Allocation in United States Medical
Research Charities, 16 FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY & MGMT. 335, 338 (2000) (reporting that the
presence of managers on boards coincided with increased managerial pay); Raymond
Fisman & R. Glenn Hubbard, Precautionary Savings and the Governance of Nonprofit
Organizations, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 2231, 2240 (2005) (reporting that compensation in the
nonprofit sector is more highly correlated with donations in states where the Attorney
General has fewer oversight powers).
13 See supra note 8.
14 The traditional view, known as the “optimal contracting” view, is that executive pay
arrangements are designed to minimize agency costs by aligning the incentives of managers
and owners. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 72 (2003). For more details, see infra Part I.A.
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—which one of us, together with Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, dubbed the
“managerial power” hypothesis—suggests that managers at for-profit firms
have been able to extract inefficiently high compensation from their
employers.15 The rational ignorance of widely dispersed shareholders, and
managers’ strong influence over the directors appointed to watch the managers,
leaves some managers constrained mainly by actual or potential “outrage,” the
emotional and ideological responses of the shareholders and press watchdogs
who notice what is happening.16
Despite the policy importance of the debate, and the widespread academic
interest it has drawn, direct evidence that looming shareholder outrage, rather
than some corporate purpose, motivates the questionable practices is scarce. As
the main evidence for their claim, managerial power theorists point to the
highly opaque pay structures managers have constructed for themselves.17
They say these structures serve no other important purpose for the firm except
to reduce outrage at the amount the managers earn, and often inefficiently
distort the way managers choose to run the firm.18 Critics, however, point to
possible justifications for some arcane pay practices.19
Managerial power theorists have so far had to rely largely on inference.
Therefore, an additional contribution of this project is to directly test the theory
that managers exert power over their own pay, and that stakeholder outrage can
constrain that power. Given the central roles played by emotion and ideology
in the formation and support of charitable organizations, the nonprofit sector

15 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 783-86
(2002); see also Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 14, at 72, 75-92 (2003).
16 Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 786-88.
17 Id. at 789; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J.
CORP. L. 823 (2005) (documenting significant utilization of highly opaque executive
pension arrangements); see also infra Part I.A. (discussing numerous pay practices that are
difficult to explain as part of an optimal contract but that are an understandable outgrowth of
managerial power).
18 Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 795-96.
Several important recent Wall Street reforms, such as SEC efforts to improve the
disclosure of executive compensation and to grant shareholders a “say on pay,” appear to be
premised on the idea that latent shareholder discontent can affect corporate behavior. See
Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case
for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (2009).
19 See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 857-67 (2002); John E.
Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1142 (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)). For an overview of the
debate in the context of retirement pay for executives, see Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle,
The False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay: Evidence from Executive Pensions and
Deferred Compensation, 38 J. CORP. L. 53, 57-64, 82-86 (2012).
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seems to be a promising laboratory for exploring the nuances of an outragefocused managerial power theory. As we’ll argue, aspects of nonprofits
provide an opportunity to test more directly for an outrage constraint, and
evidence of the operation of an outrage constraint on executive pay in the
nonprofit sector would bolster the theory more generally.
In addition, we think that extending managerial power insights to nonprofit
organizations can potentially help to explain and shape nonprofit pay.
Significant evidence of managerial power should motivate both stakeholders
and regulators of nonprofits to give more attention to existing governance
rules. Those rules, in turn, can help to prevent managerial behaviors—such as
authorizing run-ups in tuition and enrollment—that arguably are influenced by
poorly governed pay-setting processes.
Accordingly, we theorize and then construct a test for managerial power in
nonprofit executive pay-setting. Although we think adding this new theoretical
approach to nonprofit analysis is itself useful, our primary contribution arises
out of our analysis of the compensation of private college and university
presidents from 1997 through 2008. We investigate the “determinants” of
president compensation, that is, which aspects of universities or their leaders
are statistically correlated with greater or lesser pay.
As in the for-profit sector, we find, unsurprisingly, that executive
compensation is a function of organization size and tenure in office.20 But
more importantly, we find evidence consistent with stakeholder outrage
constraining executive pay. For example, we find that president pay is lower at
religiously affiliated institutions.21 This result is consistent with the managerial
power theory if one assumes, we think reasonably, that observer expectations
regarding “acceptable” levels of president compensation would be lower at
religiously affiliated institutions, although we acknowledge other more benign
explanations could also fit our results.
Furthermore, we find that president pay is lower at institutions that are more
highly dependent on current donations as a source of revenue (versus tuition,
grants, etc.), which we interpret as a sign of managerial power.22 The theory
here is that active donors provide a source of potential outrage that would be
effective in dampening pay. Schools that are relatively insulated from this
effect would be less constrained in setting compensation. Absent outrage
constraints, one would expect university president compensation to increase
when contributions rise, as more effective fundraisers are rewarded for their
success. The fact that more powerful donors are able to drive down pay levels
implies that presidents at schools with less-influential donors are extracting
more pay than donors would want.
We also find suggestive correlations between pay, donor control, and
20 As one would expect, greater organization size and longer tenures are both positively
associated with higher levels of president pay. See infra Part III.C.
21 See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Part III.C.
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outcomes such as tuition and enrollment.23 Pay and tuition are correlated, even
when we employ statistical tools to hold constant common factors, such as
school quality, that might explain the linkage. We additionally report (as we
detail in more depth in related work) that presidents respond to tighter control
from donors by shifting to forms of revenues that are less constraining.
This Article begins by providing background and a brief overview of the
leading theories of the executive pay setting process in Part I. Part II extends
the theory to nonprofit organizations and discusses the testable implications of
our theory in the context of higher education. In Part III, we describe our data,
present our analyses, and interpret the results. Part IV considers the
implications of our analyses. We also include a Methodological Appendix
detailing the finer points of our empirical analysis.
I.

EXECUTIVE PAY IN THE FOR-PROFIT AND NONPROFIT SECTORS

Although the analytical focus of this Article is on executive pay in the
nonprofit sector, specifically in higher education, the theoretical work on
executive pay is dominated by work on public company executive pay. This
Part, and the Part that follows, provide a brief overview of that literature and
explain why the managerial power theory of the executive pay-setting process
is as plausibly applicable to the nonprofit sector as to the for-profit sector. This
theoretical link is important for two reasons. First, it provides a sound basis for
the analysis of college and university president pay that follows. Second, it
paves the way for the claim made later in this Article that evidence of an
outrage constraint operating in the nonprofit sector is evidence supporting the
managerial power theory in the for-profit sector as well, which represents an
additional payoff to our work.
A.

Public Company Executive Pay

There are two competing, but to some degree complementary, theories of
the executive pay-setting process at U.S. public companies.24 The optimal
contracting theory, which dominates the corporate finance literature on
executive pay, posits that executive pay is designed to minimize managerial
agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership from control in the
widely held, Berle/Means corporation.25 As described by Michael Jensen and
23

See infra Part III.D.
A third view is that corporate law issues are better explained as a team production
problem rather than a traditional principal-agent problem. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). Under the
team production view, the board of directors serves as a mediating hierarch between
stakeholders (executives, employees, creditors) who make firm-specific investments in the
company. Id. at 276-87. This theory predicts that compensation arrangements would not be
designed to maximize shareholder value but to balance the interests of the stakeholders. See
id. at 285-87.
25 See, e.g., Core et al., supra note 8, at 27.
24
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William Meckling, these agency costs reflect the divergence between
managers’ share-value-maximizing actions and managers’ actual actions, plus
the monitoring and bonding expenditures (including contracting costs)
undertaken to reduce that divergence.26 Under this view, equity compensation
arrangements through which managers receive restricted stock, stock options,
and the like are seen as minimizing agency costs by aligning the incentives of
the executives with those of presumably diversified shareholders with respect
to share value and risk.27
One of the key insights of this literature is that corporate executives tend to
be badly underdiversified, with excessive financial capital as well as their
human capital tied up in their firms.28 As a result, all else being equal, these
executives would be more risk averse than their shareholders, who can easily
diversify.29 Paying executives with restricted company stock30 tends to
aggravate the gap between managerial and shareholder risk preferences.
However, because the value of stock options increases with share price
volatility (i.e., risk), adding options to executive pay plans can bring executive
risk preferences back into line with those of shareholders.31 This is the optimal
contracting explanation for the prevalence of option compensation.32
Proponents of the optimal contracting view do not insist that directors
always bargain vigorously with executives over the terms of their
compensation. Under this view, optimal arrangements could arise as a result of
competitive pressures exerted by markets for capital, products, labor, or even
corporate control.
Under the alternative managerial power view, executive pay arrangements
are not simply a means of combatting agency costs; these arrangements also
26

Jensen & Meckling, supra note 7, at 308-09.
Core et al., supra note 8, at 29-33; Frydman & Jenter, supra note 8, at 88-89.
28 Core et al., supra note 8, at 33.
29 Id.
30 Typically, compensatory stock becomes unrestricted, or “vests,” somewhere from one
to five years following grant. If the executive’s employment is terminated prior to vesting,
the stock generally must be returned. See FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., THE 2009 TOP 250:
LONG-TERM INCENTIVE GRANT PRACTICES FOR EXECUTIVES 5-6, 12-13 (2009), available at
http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/2009_Top-250-Report.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/KQ78-943N.
31 More generally, companies face a tradeoff in compensating executives. They want to
provide high-powered incentives to encourage the executives to work hard and to take on
appropriately risky projects, but compensation arrangements have to be mutually acceptable,
and non-diversified executives discount risky, high-powered pay instruments. Thus, while
option compensation may mitigate risk aversion concerns, it may be expensive to pay
executives with options. Walker, supra note 8, at 236-38.
32 There are other explanations. There is little doubt that accounting and tax rules have
influenced the use and the design of option compensation. See, e.g., David I. Walker &
Victor Fleischer, Book/Tax Conformity and Equity Compensation, 62 TAX L. REV. 399, 40312 (2009).
27
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reflect agency costs.33 The managerial power story begins with the observation
that many features of executive compensation arrangements—such as option
designs that allow executives to reap windfalls during bull markets—appear to
be inconsistent with a share-value-maximizing model.34 The managerial power
view posits that executive pay practices do not uniformly reflect vigorous
bargaining and that executives exert more influence over the terms of their pay
than would be expected in an arm’s length bargaining situation.35 Further,
under this view, pressures from competitive markets for capital, products,
labor, and corporate control are seen as insufficient to significantly constrain
executive pay, which, even when outlandish, tends to represent a small fraction
of costs for a large, public corporation.36
The threat (or reality) of investor and financial press outrage plays an
important role in disciplining executive compensation under the managerial
power view.37 The idea is that executives and outside directors bear personal
costs when these constituencies become outraged over pay levels or pay
practices. In order to minimize outrage, executives and their boards seek out
low salience channels of compensation and other means of camouflaging
compensation.38 The result under the managerial power view is that public
company executives receive both more pay and different forms of pay than
they would in a well-functioning market, all of which is costly for
shareholders.
Prior theory has not specified exactly the mechanism of action for the
outrage constraint. One possible view is that outrage comprises a set of social
sanctions on managers who extract excessive rents: the firm is a cooperative
enterprise, and participants impose largely intangible punishment on those
whom they know to be violating the implicit cooperative norm.39 Or, more
broadly, managers may face judgment from their friends and peers for
violating social norms. A third possibility is that outrage represents latent
action on the part of other stakeholders, action that could be motivated by
emotion or ideology. The literature on collective action reports that emotional
and ideological commitments often are key factors in groups that successfully

33

Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 784.
Id. at 795-817.
35 Id. at 771-74.
36 Id. at 774-79.
37 Id. at 786-88.
38 Id. at 789-91.
39 Cf. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 35-37, 88-89, 205-07 (1990) (describing use of norms in the informal
governance of shared resources). We note that punishment may, but need not, be related to
the efficacy of the manager’s pay structure as a system for incentivizing maximum returns
to stakeholders. Participants may also have preferences for the distribution of firm profits
that do not align perfectly with the distributionally neutral optimal incentive structure.
34
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overcome free riding.40 Managers would then aim to avoid outrage as a way of
ensuring that their principals continue to only loosely monitor management.
Evidence supporting the managerial power theory of the executive paysetting process in the public company setting is largely indirect. For example,
we observe that executives and boards camouflage compensation by
emphasizing relatively opaque pay channels such as deferred compensation41
or backdated stock options,42 and we infer that they do so to minimize outrage
over pay levels. Some commentators have argued that insufficient pay for
performance sensitivity43 or a lack of relative performance evaluation44
undermines the persuasiveness of the optimal contracting theory, but others
remain unconvinced.45
The totality of the evidence does not support any single theoretical
framework regarding executive compensation in the for-profit sector. In fact, it
seems likely that the optimal contracting and managerial power views co-exist,
40

See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 108-12 (1982); Lise Vesterlund, Why
Do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 568, 569-78 (Walter
W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006); David Knoke, Incentives in Collective
Action Organizations, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 311, 326 (1988).
41 Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 17, at 831 (suggesting that opaque deferred
compensation arrangements might be attractive as a means of reducing the salience of
compensation, even if the arrangements are inefficient).
42 David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the
Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 603 (2007) (“It is hard to imagine more
thoroughly camouflaged compensation than secretly backdated options whose value far
exceeds that reported to shareholders.”).
43 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 227 (1990) (arguing that evidence of minimal pay for
performance sensitivity in CEO contracts is “inconsistent with the implications of formal
agency models of optimal contracting”).
44 Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance, 77
HARV. BUS. REV. 91, 92-94 (1999) (“The huge gains from options for below-average
performers should give pause to even the most ardent defender of current corporate pay
systems.”); cf. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 334-38
(1982) (explaining the importance of relative performance evaluation in overcoming moral
hazard in the corporate setting).
45 Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.
J. ECON. 653, 653-56 (1998) (finding that increased pay for performance sensitivity
undermines the view that CEOs are paid like bureaucrats, whose performance or lack
thereof has no bearing on pay); see also George P. Baker & Brian J. Hall, CEO Incentives
and Firm Size, 22 J. LAB. ECON. 767 (2004) (attributing “the existence of expensive
corporate staffs in large firms” to “the high marginal product of CEO effort in [those]
firms”); Core et al., supra note 8, at 31-32 (summarizing arguments against managerial
power view); Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation,
14 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 7 (2000) (describing corporate incentive “to give more pay in the
form of bonuses and stock options,” since most qualify as performance-based compensation
for which a corporate deduction is allowed).
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providing relatively more or less explanatory power at particular companies
and at particular times.46
B.

The Conventional View of Nonprofit Executive Pay in Theory and
Practice

In contrast, the dominant view among commentators is that excessive pay is
not a pervasive concern in the nonprofit sector, and U.S. law largely reflects
that view. A recent economics text on nonprofit governance quotes
approvingly another author’s observation that “‘boards should not necessarily
invest in . . . mechanisms . . . to curb . . . CEO pay excesses.’”47 Intellectual
leaders in both compensation design and nonprofits, ranging from incentivepay godfathers Eugene Fama and Jensen to Susan Rose-Ackerman and Burton
Weisbrod, have made similar claims.48
These authors argue that self-selection, ideological alignment with donors,
and “stewardship” constrain rent-seeking by managers at nonprofit
organizations.49 If managers know that cash compensation is typically lower at
nonprofits, individuals who accept the job will be those who are less motivated
by cash.50 Instead, commentators argue, nonprofit managers are motivated
primarily by a drive to help others or otherwise to fulfill some ideological
mission.51 Taking cash from the organization would diminish its capacity to

46

Some commentators believe that director oversight and the quality of executive pay
practices at public companies have improved in recent years as a result of mandated “say on
pay” votes; greater involvement of proxy advising firms, such as Institutional Shareholder
Services; and the like. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, CEO Pay and Corporate Governance in
the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, 25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 24 (2013).
47 JEGERS, supra note 11, at 60 (quoting Jobome, supra note 11, at 350).
48 See infra note 51.
49 See supra note 11.
50 Caers et al., supra note 11, at 31; Femida Handy & Eliakim Katz, The Wage
Differential Between Nonprofit Institutions and Corporations: Getting More by Paying
Less?, 26 J. COMP. ECON. 246, 249-50 (1998).
51 See supra note 11; Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and
Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 344-45 (1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Agency
Problems]; Myron J. Roomkin & Burton A. Weisbrod, Managerial Compensation and
Incentives in For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 750, 751-52 (1999)
(suggesting that nonprofit firms use compensation structures to select managers who are not
motivated by money and do not need close monitoring to prevent diversion of funds); Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 701, 716
(1996) [hereinafter Rose-Ackerman, Altruism] (suggesting that ideological commitment
helps to overcome agency problems in some nonprofits); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Ideals
Versus Dollars: Donors, Charity Managers, and Government Grants, 95 J. POL. ECON. 810,
812 (1987). But cf. George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The
Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable
Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1147-48 (2004) (recognizing that boards of complex
nonprofits have many members, creating substantial opportunities for free riding).

2014]

NONPROFIT EXECUTIVE PAY

1893

accomplish its goals, which the manager presumably shares.52 And managers
at nonprofits may be “stewards,” that is, the kind of people who prefer to
sacrifice (or at least be perceived as sacrificing) on behalf of others.53
Scholars recognize that nonprofits suffer from managerial agency problems
that are similar to those observed in the for-profit sector, but they argue that
fact supports their views on managerial pay. As in the case of public
companies, large nonprofits are characterized by a separation of ownership
from control.54 The separation in nonprofits is even more severe, as they lack
several control mechanisms, such as the pressure of shareholder voting or exit,
that for-profits can employ.55 As a result, managers have a great deal of
freedom to run the organization as they please. If so, they may have less of an
incentive to extract excess compensation from the organization; the money is
essentially under their control either way.56
These theories, though popular, have not been subjected to much empirical
testing. Gregory Jobome argues, on the basis of a survey of U.K. nonprofits,
that he finds evidence in support of the stewardship hypothesis, though it
would be more accurate as a statistical matter to say that he fails to find
evidence rejecting it.57 Other authors have claimed, based on findings that link
presidential compensation to “quality” measures such as the U.S. News &
World Report ranking, that university presidents are being paid in accordance
with the size and complexity of their institutions and with performance.58 But
the fact that better managers are paid more does not rule out the possibility that
all managers are paid too much, or that significant agency slack remains.
Similarly, findings that for-profit managers on average earn more than their
nonprofit counterparts tell us only that nonprofit managers receive some nonpecuniary rewards from their jobs, and not whether they also take opportunities
to award themselves more cash when possible.59
Nonprofit governance in the real world mirrors the dominant academic view
in taking a highly laissez-faire view of executive pay. State attorneys general

52

JEGERS, supra note 11, at 59; see Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, supra note 51, at 719-20
(arguing that managers trade off cash pay for ability to achieve ideological goals).
53 Stijn Van Puyvelde et al., The Governance of Nonprofit Organizations: Integrating
Agency Theory with Stakeholder and Stewardship Theories, 41 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY
SECTOR Q. 431, 436 (2012)
54 Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 11, at 308-10, 319.
55 See supra note 11; supra note 51.
56 See JEGERS, supra note 11, at 58-59; Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, supra note 51, at 71920.
57 That is, he cannot distinguish the effect he measures from zero. But Jobome does
nothing to rule out “Type II error”—the fact that his methods did not unearth a relationship
does not prove its absence. Jobome, supra note 11, at 350-51.
58 Thomas Li-Ping Tang et al., Factors Related to University Presidents’ Pay: An
Examination of Private Colleges and Universities, 39 HIGHER EDUC. 393, 411 (2000).
59 See JEGERS, supra note 11, at 58-60, for a review of the relevant findings.
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are responsible for nonprofit oversight, including oversight of executive
compensation.60 But AGs are subject to their own agency problems and
resource constraints, and most AG offices have scant resources for the number
of organizations nominally under their supervision.61 Even if AGs were
energetic and attentive, courts grant almost complete deference to board
compensation decisions, unless those decisions are the result of blatant
conflicts of interest.62
Another possible limitation is built into the federal tax code. Under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3), “no part of the net earnings” of a tax-exempt charitable
organization may “inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual.”63 Thus, while the law permits paying a public company executive
a portion of firm earnings as an incentive, such an arrangement is largely offlimits in the nonprofit sector.64 Private inurement rules also prohibit managers
from taking home compensation in excess of fair market value, since that
might represent a disguised form of profit distribution.65
Of course, nonprofit executives must be paid a competitive wage. The
difficulty lies in distinguishing between competitive compensation, which is
allowed, and “excess benefit transactions” that represent forbidden private
inurement. Since 2002, this line has largely been policed by the “intermediate
sanctions” rules of the tax code.66 Under these rules, significant financial
penalties can be imposed on nonprofit executives and directors who engage in
“excess benefit transactions,” which include the provision of excessive
executive pay.67
60

MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 54 (2004).
61 Manne, supra note 10, at 250-51; see Frumkin & Andre-Clark, supra note 9, at 44147; Mark Sidel, The Nonprofit Sector and the New State Activism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1312,
1334-35 (2002) (reviewing NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE
EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN NONPROFIT SECTOR (2001)).
62 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 60, at 53.
63 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). However, firms are allowed to provide some limited
incentives to executives, as long as the incentive is not the equivalent of a share of profits.
James R. Hines Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1193-96 (2010).
64 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,674 (Oct. 23, 1987) (concluding that profit-sharing
arrangements for physicians at nonprofit hospitals were not per se illegal but would be
scrutinized closely by the IRS).
65 Frumkin & Andre-Clark, supra note 9, at 467.
66 I.R.C. § 4958 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1 (2002). These sanctions are described
as “intermediate” in the sense that they are less draconian than revoking a nonprofit
organization’s tax-exempt status. For a thorough overview of the Intermediate Sanctions
regime, see Carly B. Eisenberg & Kevin Outterson, Agents Without Principals: Regulating
the Duty of Loyalty for Nonprofit Corporations Through the Intermediate Sanctions Tax
Regulations, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 243, 251-70 (2012).
67 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1, -4(b)(1)(ii) (2002).
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While the Intermediate Sanctions rules strongly encourage nonprofits to
follow certain procedures in setting executive pay, they are unlikely to provide
significant discipline on the substance of these awards.68 The rules offer a “safe
harbor”69 for nearly all compensation packages awarded by well-advised
boards. The rules include a rebuttable presumption that transactions, including
awards of pay, are not excess benefit transactions if 1) they are approved in
advance by a nonprofit board or committee composed of individuals who have
no conflict of interest, 2) the board or committee obtained and relied on
appropriate data in determining pay, and 3) the board or committee adequately
documented the basis for its decision.70 If these criteria are met, the burden
shifts to the IRS to show that a pay grant was an excess benefit transaction.71
Organizations can defend their award by pointing to pay in similar for-profit
industries,72 and first-time contracts are exempt from any excess-benefit
scrutiny at all.73
II.

TOWARDS A THEORY OF MANAGERIAL POWER IN THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR

In our view, the standard account of nonprofit executive compensation is too
optimistic. In this Part we will argue that money can drive a significant wedge
between the interests of managers and those who are invested in the success of
their firms. Further, drawing on insights from the existing managerial power
literature, we will argue that stakeholder outrage is likely to constrain nonprofit
executive pay in such a way as to explain variations in compensation between
seemingly similar organizations. This literature also suggests ways in which
our hypothesis could be tested empirically. Finally, in Part II.C, we discuss
these general points in the specific context of colleges and universities.
A.

What Matters to Nonprofit Managers?

While nonprofit managers may highly value mission, ideology, or prestige,
powerful empirical evidence suggests that they also can be motivated by
money. Many organizations pay cash bonuses, and several studies find some
evidence of “pay for performance” in the nonprofit sector—managers who do a
good job are paid more.74 These data points imply at least that the boards that
set executive pay believe it influences managers.
Prior commentators recognize this basic point, but seemingly assume that

68 Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 736 (2007).
69 Id.
70 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a) (2002).
71 Id. § 53.4958-6(b).
72 Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii).
73 Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(3).
74 See Hines et al., supra note 63, at 1194-98.
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managerial desire for higher pay is limited and will not undermine executives’
incentives to serve the interests of the firm’s stakeholders.75 As we just noted,
some commentators argue that a manager might prefer to leave funds in the
organization, since she controls those funds and uses them to achieve her
personal goals.76
We think that managers are unlikely to make this trade-off at nonprofits of
any meaningful size. The marginal contribution of a dollar to the
organization’s outputs will be very small relative to its contribution to the
manager’s utility. That is, a million dollars is not going to move a university
from Beach Bum State to Elite U, but that same million would dramatically
transform the life of a president previously earning $100,000 per year. Further,
the quality of the organization’s output is a public good shared among the
stakeholders; as earlier work demonstrates, even altruists should typically
prefer to free ride on the contributions of others.77
Next, defenders of the status quo also note that higher compensation could
cost the manager some of the reward that comes in the form of “warm glow.”78
Nonprofit managers are willing to give up some cash, despite the factors we
just identified, because they derive some offsetting value, or warm glow, from
the act of donation.79 Part of the manager’s satisfaction from doing her job may
be the approval of peers or others.80 Game theory and evolutionary biology,
among other disciplines, offer explanations for why humans might admire and
reward our self-sacrificing colleagues.81 Managers who value these rewards
75

See supra note 11.
See supra note 56.
77 James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of WarmGlow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464-65 (1990). That is, pure altruists are those who want to
see others do well solely because they care about those others’ wellbeing. Therefore, the
altruist is equally happy if others’ lives are better, whether that outcome was caused by the
altruist or not. If improvements are costly, the altruist is best off when someone else pays for
the benefits the altruist hopes will occur.
In some public goods settings, free ridership is lower because one or a few contributors
can make disproportionately large contributions (leaving them with little free-riding
opportunity, and other contributors with a large value for a small contribution), see RoseAckerman, Altruism, supra note 51, at 713, but this would not be the case for one employee
in a large firm.
78 See Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems, supra note 51, at 344; Rose-Ackerman,
Altruism, supra note 51, at 714.
79 For a review of the evidence on warm glow compensation, see Laura Leete, Work in
the Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 40, at
159, 159-65, and for more extended discussion, see Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable,
88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1223-25 (2010).
80 Galle, supra note 79, at 1223.
81 See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Nature of Human Altruism, 425 NATURE
785 (2003); David G. Rand et al., Direct Reciprocity with Costly Punishment: Generous Titfor-Tat Prevails, 256 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 45 (2009).
76
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might lose some of them if they are observed to draw a large paycheck.82
We would argue in response that lower pay is not necessarily the only way
to preserve the manager’s “glow.” If warm glow is comprised in large part of
the approval of others, the manager can have her cake and eat it too, by
ensuring that her high pay is opaque to outside eyes. And opacity may be easy
to obtain, since even strong boards of directors might willingly provide opaque
pay if it allows them to save on extra cash they would otherwise have to pay
the manager (and maximize their own social approval).
A last argument against the possibility of excess managerial pay in the
nonprofit sector is that cash is tax-disfavored relative to warm glow or other
rewards of leaving money in the organization. Employees are taxed on cash or
in-kind compensation, but generally not on psychic benefits.83 At a for-profit
firm, reducing cash pay in favor of psychic benefits is tax-favored for the
employee, but tax-disfavored for the employer, which loses out on its
deduction for the costs of compensation.84 But nonprofit employers are usually
tax-exempt and so have no need for deductions.85 Rewarding employees with
psychic benefits rather than cash would therefore be wholly tax favorable for
most nonprofit firms.
These kinds of tax considerations seem to be a secondary consideration in
many pay-setting contexts, however.86 In any event, the tax advantage of noncash rewards diminishes as the share of cash pay goes down, since the
employee’s marginal tax rate on cash also declines when her cash pay drops.
It is likely that neither these arguments nor our counterarguments are wholly
right, but instead present managers with sets of trade-offs. That is, if managers
had complete control over their own compensation structure, their pay would
represent a balancing among these factors.87 Assuming a diminishing marginal
value of cash, diminishing warm glow returns to making a charitable
contribution, and a decreasing marginal tax benefit to warm glow
compensation, we should expect managers to optimally select a mix of cash
and other rewards. Few managers will starve or live under a bridge in order to

82 See Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, supra note 51, at 714 (observing that donors may lose
value of giving if others perceive their actions as overly self-serving).
83 JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 75-76 (16th ed. 2012).
84 Absent an explicit expenditure, simply providing a warm glow to an employee would
not generate a deduction for an ordinary and necessary business expense. I.R.C. § 162(a)
(2012).
85 But see I.R.C. § 512 (2012) (imposing tax on unrelated business income of federally
recognized nonprofits).
86 See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Examining the Tax Advantages of
Founders’ Stock, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1085, 1100-15 (2012).
87 See Handy & Katz, supra note 50, at 258-59, and Anne E. Preston, The Nonprofit
Worker in a For-Profit World, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 438, 442 (1989) for formal models of how
firms and managers choose between mixes of pure cash versus cash plus fringe benefits and
amenities.
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earn warm glow, but those that value warm glow will take some degree of a
pay cut to earn it.
The pay structures preferred by organizations may not match the manager’s
optimum, giving rise to incentives for managerial opportunism. To take the
simplest example, the organization may have some bargaining power and may
offer the manager a total award of combined cash and glow that is less than her
optimal level. If she can’t easily extract additional warm glow from the
organization, her main alternative is to take opportunities to award herself
more cash.
Similarly, other stakeholders may have preferences for a different mix of
compensation. Outside donors, too, may be motivated by warm glow.88
Donors’ glow could depend on the manager’s pay: Will other outsiders
perceive the donor as noble if her money goes to pay for the president’s private
jet? Assuming the pay package the organization offers reflects donor
preferences to some degree, the manager will again have incentives to move
closer to her personal optimum by extracting additional cash from the
organization.
In sum, even managers who are strongly motivated by their nonprofit
mission also feel the need for, and often incentive to acquire, additional cash.
So they have motive, what about means and opportunity?
B.

What Constrains the Compensation of Nonprofit Managers?

As we have just set out, a modest reading of the standard literature on
nonprofit executive pay would be that pay is lower in this sector because of
manager self-selection and the warm glow enjoyed by managers and other
stakeholders. We do not dispute such a modest claim, but we argue that
monetary compensation matters as well; that monetary compensation is
significant; and that managerial agency theory, specifically, the managerial
power theory, can help explain the variation in cash compensation and benefits
received by managers of various nonprofits.
We would argue that many of the factors that lead to managerial power in
the for-profit setting apply as strongly, if not more so, in nonprofits. As in
public companies, boards of directors or trustees are charged with negotiating
nonprofit executive pay.89 These boards are likely to be relatively weak and the
executives relatively strong with respect to the pay-setting process, and other
matters, for the same reasons that public company boards are weak and
executives strong. First, nonprofit trustees are part-timers who typically spend
a small fraction of their time exercising oversight over the organization, while
the full-time executives set the agenda and control the flow of information to
the trustees.90 Second, the trustees are not spending their own money when
88

Andreoni, supra note 77, at 464-65 (1990); Vesterlund, supra note 40, at 568, 572-

573.
89
90

ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, PLANNING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 2A.02 (2014).
James J. Fishman, Standards of Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7
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they negotiate executive pay. In fact, while public company directors are
increasingly compensated with equity,91 which may encourage them to think
and act more like owners, nonprofit trustees can have no direct economic
interest in their organizations.92 Third, as in the case of public company
directors, nonprofit trustees are likely to be bound to the senior executives
through various formal and informal ties that encourage a culture of deference
to the executives.93 Other stakeholders rarely have both incentives and
resources to closely monitor executive pay.94
In fact, the agency problem is likely to be more severe in the nonprofit
sector. At public companies, it is generally possible for a party to accumulate a
sufficient number of shares to gain control, and this possibility places some
upper bound on agency costs.95 In the nonprofit sector, there is no market for
organizational control and no such upper bound.96 Further, the absence of a
PACE L. REV. 389, 397 (1987); cf. Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 772 (describing impact
of similar dynamic at for-profit firms).
91 Frydman & Jenter, supra note 8, at 80-82.
92 Hansmann, supra note 10, at 838. Nonprofit firms may, but usually do not, offer
directors simple salary or other non-proprietary compensation. See Maureen Glabman, The
Future of Voluntary Governance, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Sept. 2006, at 67, 68
(observing scarcity of compensated board members in nonprofit sector).
93 See Avner Ben-Ner & Theresa Van Hoomissen, The Governance of Nonprofit
Organizations: Law and Public Policy, 4 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 393, 404-05
(1994); Danné L. Johnson, Seeking Meaningful Nonprofit Reform in a Post Sarbanes-Oxley
World, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 187, 203-04 (2009) (“It is not unusual for the incestuous
director relationship, common in the for-profit sector, to be replicated on nonprofit
boards . . . .”); Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors and Executive
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 293
(1995). These close relationships may also affect the psychological and cognitive pathways
that lead to effective governance. Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink
and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1189-1210 (2010).
Although the Intermediate Sanctions rules discussed above essentially require that
nonprofit directors charged with approving executive pay not have a conflict of interest, that
standard ensures only a very modest degree of independence. Efforts to increase outside
director independence in the for-profit sector, such as by removing inside directors from
board nominating committees, generally have not carried over to the nonprofit sector. IRS
regulations do reward board independence in certain situations, using independence as a
plus factor in the determination of public charity status, see Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)(3) (as
amended in 2011), but for many nonprofits, such as the institutions of higher education that
are the focus of this study, public charity status is automatic, see I.R.C. § 509(a)(1) (2012),
and thus this lever is unimportant.
94 Frumkin & Andre-Clark, supra note 9, at 461-62, 482.
95 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 7, at 352; Henry G. Manne, Bring Back the Hostile
Takeover, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2002, at A18.
96 Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 11, at 319; Rodrigues, supra note 10, at 126869. If large donors tend to be granted seats on the board of directors, there may be
something like a slow-motion market for corporate control, in that outsiders can potentially
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market for organizational control reduces board and managerial incentives to
achieve maximal cost effectiveness.97 This can be a benefit, since charity is
rarely just about the bottom line. But it does mean that pressure to reduce
compensation and other costs is rather lower.
Though these traditional mechanisms are weak constraints in the nonprofit
sector, we would argue that the threat or reality of outrage98 could play an
important role in disciplining the pay of nonprofit executives. Like their forprofit counterparts, nonprofit managers and board members may experience
personal costs if others believe that the manager receives excessive
compensation. By definition, nonprofit organizations do not share a
cooperative venture with investors, but they do have donors, beneficiaries or
customers, and employees.
Nonprofit managers and trustees are also likely to be particularly sensitive to
more general social perception of their pay. Again, to the extent that the public
approval aspect of warm glow is an important component of the manager’s
compensation, she pays a price for disappointing the public.
Lastly, nonprofit managers may be constrained by latent stakeholder
responses to higher reported pay. Warm glow is an important motive for
donors.99 If donors’ attachment to the nonprofit is diminished by emotional or
ideological disappointment in its leader’s pay, donations may fall, leaving the
manager with fewer resources available to pursue her own goals.100 As a result,
nonprofit boards are rightly concerned “‘that raising [executive] salaries could
tarnish a group’s public image.’”101
Anecdotal evidence supports the notion that nonprofit executives and boards
are sensitive to the perception of their pay practices.102 Like their for-profit
purchase the ability to direct the firm. Eleanor Brown & Al Slivinski, Nonprofit
Organizations and the Market, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra
note 40, at 140, 154. But there is no opportunity for a hostile takeover; an existing board can
simply refuse to seat new board members who would diminish their control.
97 Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, supra note 51, at 717.
98 Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 786-88.
99 See supra note 88.
100 Cf. Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, supra note 51, at 714, 719 (positing that if donors’
emotional rewards from giving decline, so do gifts, and that managers’ signals of
ideological commitment may be important to donors). The role of the press in this story is
unclear. The press may serve simply as an intermediary—the means by which information is
passed to the stakeholders who express approbation or disapprobation—or the press may
contribute more directly to an outrage constraint if managers are sensitive to adverse press
coverage independent of its impact on donors, employees, and other stakeholders.
101 Sharon M. Oster, Executive Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector, 8 NONPROFIT
MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 207, 219 (1998) (quoting nonprofit compensation consultant Leonard
Pfeifer); see Dennis R. Young, Executive Leadership in Nonprofit Organizations, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 167, 172-75 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987)
(stating that donors expect nonprofit managers to partially volunteer their efforts).
102 Kertz, supra note 9, at 820.
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brethren, nonprofit executives often receive a considerable portion of their total
compensation in less visible forms, such as deferred compensation and
perquisites.103 Moreover, some nonprofit executives receive only a portion of
their compensation directly from their employer with the balance coming from
an outside foundation.104 Aside from camouflaging total compensation, it is
difficult to imagine what purpose is served by splitting compensation in this
way.105
Our claims about the importance of outrage as a constraint on nonprofit pay
lead us to a testable hypothesis. Nonprofit organizations subject to greater
actual or potential outrage on the part of various constituencies or observers
should pay less, all else equal. In the next two subparts, we describe how
institutional differences are likely to lead to differences in the outrage
constraint. In Part III, we will test whether these differences do indeed result in
differences in pay.
C.

Outrage Constraints and the Example of Colleges and Universities

The nonprofit sector seems a promising place to search for variation in
outrage constraints. As noted above, evidence from the for-profit sector of the
managerial power theory and the impact of an outrage constraint is largely
inferential. We see that executives and boards camouflage compensation and
deduce that they do so to minimize outrage—but there are few, if any,
differences between firms in a particular for-profit subsector (say
manufacturing or utilities) that would have a predictable and testable impact on
the outrage constraint and thus pay levels at various firms. By contrast, there
are several factors at play in nonprofits (and absent or of less significance in
the for-profit sector) that should have a differential impact on the outrage
constraint from organization to organization and that may provide more
103

ROBERT H. ATWELL & JANE V. WELLMAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMPENSATION IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 2 (2000); Kertz, supra note 9, at 865-66; Wendy K. Szymanski, An Allegory of
Good (and Bad) Governance: Applying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit Organizations,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 1303, 1323-24 (observing that loans with favorable terms are common
in nonprofit compensation).
104 Ronald G. Ehrenberg et al., Paying Our Presidents: What Do Trustees Value?, 25
REV. HIGHER EDUC. 15, 17 (2001); Julianne Basinger & Sarah H. Henderson, Hidden Costs
of High Public Pay, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 14, 2003, at A3; see CHARITY
NAVIGATOR, 2012 CEO COMPENSATION STUDY app. at 16 (Nov. 2012), available at
http://www.charitynavigator.org/__asset__/studies/2012_CEO_Compensation_Study_Final.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9DSU-T3SC (indicating that some firms in the study pay
their executives through use of multiple affiliate organizations).
105 Some state institutions reportedly rely on compensation from multiple sources to
avoid state-law caps on public employee salaries. Basinger & Henderson, supra note 104.
But there is no comparable explanation for the practice among private entities.
It also is possible that executives are concealing pay from employees as well as—or
rather than—donors. Wage equity reportedly is important to worker motivation in the
nonprofit sector. Leete, supra note 79, at 164.
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compelling evidence of the existence and scope of that constraint.
Several commentators have observed that the public expects leaders of
charitable organizations to be paid less than their for-profit peers.106 Referring
to the comments section of its webpage, Charity Navigator notes that “[m]any
donors assume that charity leaders work for free or minimal pay and are
shocked to see that they earn six figure salaries.”107 It is not clear, however,
that the public considers private colleges and universities to be in the same
category as more innately charitable organizations, such as churches and relief
agencies, even though all of these organizations are lumped together as “public
charities” under the tax code.
In particular, outrage might depend on the nature of the nonprofit’s mission.
Observers likely expect greater self-sacrifice from employees at organizations
with clear-cut spiritual or public service missions, such as churches and relief
organizations. By contrast, nonprofits with large revenues and many paying
customers may look more “commercial” and therefore carry an expectation of
something like market salaries.108 Unfortunately, it is not feasible to test for the
impact of an outrage constraint across nonprofit subsectors. It is not practical
to separate the impact of the outrage constraint from other factors that would
differentially affect pay levels across subsectors (e.g., higher levels of pay for
nonprofit hospital executives resulting from higher pay levels enjoyed by forprofit hospital executives).
Thus, while we suspect that the managerial power view and the outrage
constraint help to explain the pay setting process at U.S. nonprofits generally,
the focus in this Article is on the compensation of the leaders in one particular
nonprofit subsector—private colleges and universities. We choose higher
education because it comprises a large portion of the nonprofit sector, because
the variation in mission among different institutions provides a version of the
ideal study outlined in the last paragraph, and because of the ready availability
of relevant data.
We focus on private colleges and universities for two reasons. First, as
discussed below, we have managed to collect a wealth of data on the

106 Regina E. Herzlinger, Effective Oversight: A Guide for Nonprofit Directors, HARV.
BUS. REV., July 1994, at 52, 52.
107
CHARITY NAVIGATOR, supra note 104, at 1.
108 See Hansmann, supra note 10, at 875-76; Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the “Contract
Failure” Explanation for Nonprofit Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1003-04 (1997) (suggesting that warm glow motive is more likely in
non-commercial firms). This is not to suggest that outrage would play no role in the paysetting process at nonprofit hospitals, only that the effect would be similar to that observed
in the for-profit world where warm glow is totally absent.
Alternately, Usha Rodrigues argues that because customers of service-providing
nonprofits can draw on their own direct observations and the reports of peers, the need for
and expectation of “signals” of charitable status are less important for those entities.
Rodrigues, supra note 10, at 1293-1303.
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compensation of private college and university presidents, donations, and
various important control variables. Second, and more importantly, the agency
problems at public and private universities are different. While both private
and public university heads typically report to boards of trustees, in the private
university sphere, the chain of command ends there. Private university boards
are self-replicating and/or include members elected by alumni.109 Either way,
there is a great deal of independence. Many public university trustees are
selected by state governors and other political actors.110 Moreover, public
universities are often organized into a state system. The head of the state
system, rather than the president of a particular university, may be the most
senior executive within the system. In some cases, the publicly funded
compensation of public university presidents is capped under state law.111 Even
where pay is not formally capped, it may be limited by the realities of state
budgeting processes. At bottom, a public university president is a government
official, not an autonomous head of an independent institution.112
In a 2007 study, James Monks found that public university presidents earned
about 50% less than their counterparts at comparable private universities.113
Monks suggested that the difference might be explained by different skill sets
required in the two jobs.114 Public university presidents need to be skilled at
managing state appropriation processes, while private university presidents
need to be expert at attracting private donations.115 Another explanation,
however, would be that the agency problem is more severe in the non-

109 James O. Freedman, Presidents and Trustees, in GOVERNING ACADEMIA 9, 13
(Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 2005).
110 Donald E. Heller, State Governance of Academia, in GOVERNING ACADEMIA, supra
note 109, at 49, 53.
111 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 1012.975(2) (2013) (“[A] state university president may not
receive more than $225,000 in remuneration annually from public funds.”). The Florida
legislature has not restricted university president salary funding from other sources.
§ 1012.975(3) (“This section does not prohibit any party from providing cash or cashequivalent compensation from funds that are not public funds . . . .”).
112 For evidence on the role of politics in setting public university budgets, see Robert C.
Lowry, The Effects of State Political Interests and Campus Outputs on Public University
Revenues, 20 ECON. EDUC. REV. 105, 117-18 (2001); for a brief review of other studies, see
also Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Econometric Studies of Higher Education, 121 J. ECONOMETRICS
19, 28-29 (2004).
113 James Monks, Public Versus Private University Presidents Pay Levels and Structure,
26 ECON. EDUC. REV. 338, 345 (2007). Because total compensation was inconsistently
reported, Monks analyzed university president salaries rather than total compensation. Id. at
341. It is conceivable that some of the gap in salary was offset by other benefits. However,
Monks found that presidents tended to move from public to private institutions and not in
the reverse direction, id. at 342, 347-48, which suggests that the total package of benefits
(pay, benefits, prestige, and the like) was greater in the private university sphere.
114 Id. at 346-47.
115 Id.
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governmental nonprofit sector, at least to the extent of university president pay.
State law, appropriations processes, or university system administration may
be more effective at restraining compensation of particular university
presidents than an independent board of trustees.
D.

Testable Implications of the Outrage Constraint at Private Colleges and
Universities

What then are the possible sources of outrage variation across colleges and
universities? We see four primary sets of differences, which will form the
focus of the empirical analysis that follows.
1.

Religious Affiliation

Although religious affiliation may have little or no impact on the scope or
demands of an executive’s job, consistent with the previous discussion,
observers may feel that the head of a college with a religious affiliation should
be paid at a relatively low level. They may feel that the charitable nature of the
organization should extend to its senior management. At one level, we would
simply expect a more strongly negative visceral reaction to the announcement
that the president of a religiously affiliated college received $1 million in pay
than we would to the same announcement with respect to the president of an
otherwise identical secular college. At a deeper level, the theory here is that
donors to “commercial” nonprofits are more likely to simply be customers
purchasing a product, while donors to organizations with a clearer ideological
mission will derive a greater measure of utility from the warm glow of
giving.116 Customers purchasing a product may view high pay simply as a
signal of quality. In contrast, high pay can diminish the warm glow of giving
by contradicting donors’ distributive or other ideological preferences and by
undermining the social consensus that the organization is “noble” or “worthy.”
If insiders won’t sacrifice on behalf of the organization, that could be taken as
a signal that less-informed supporters shouldn’t, either.117
In sum, we would expect the outrage constraint to be set at a relatively lower
level and to result in relatively lower executive pay at organizations with a
religious affiliation. To be sure, though, there would be competing
explanations, such as self-selection, for a finding of a negative association
between religious affiliation and pay levels.118
116

See Rodrigues, supra note 10, at 1295 (conceding that religious hospitals may rely
more on charitable signaling because it could provide them additional benefits not available
to secular competitors).
117 See GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE
ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY 7-9 (1993) (introducing claim that organizations
overcome free rider problems through mutual signaling of commitment, among other
factors).
118 For an examination of the possibility that different pay structures in the nonprofit
sector attract employees with different sets of motivations, see Anne E. Preston, Women in
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Exposure to Current Donations

Private colleges and universities receive funds from operations, government
grants, donations, and other sources; and relative dependence on these sources
varies. Again, we expect that because donors are more motivated by warm
glow, they are generally more sensitive to perceived excess executive pay than
are other revenue providers, such as customers (students and parents) or grantmaking agencies.119 At least under our first and third theories of outrage,
differences in schools’ sources of funding should affect compensation. If
outrage consists of social sanctions from other stakeholders, or represents the
threat of more tangible latent stakeholder action, executives of schools (and
their boards) that are relatively more exposed to potential outrage on the part of
current donors because current donations make up a relatively large portion of
revenues may feel more constrained in providing high levels of executive pay.
Our second suggested mechanism, more general social disapprobation, could
also be at play if executives’ and trustees’ social circles tend to give more
recognition to leaders of organizations with greater donor support. Thus, we
would expect that all else being equal, college and university president pay
levels decline with the fraction of revenues that consists of current donations.
This is a particularly interesting prediction because, absent outrage, one
would expect university president compensation to increase with increasing
contributions as more effective fundraisers are rewarded for their success.
While the predicted association between religious affiliation and pay could be
explained by other mechanisms, it is more difficult to come up with plausible
alternative explanations for why compensation would decrease with fundraising success. As discussed below, several possible alternative explanations
seem quite unlikely.
Of course, in order for donor dependence to constrain presidential pay in the
manner we have hypothesized, it must be the case that donors both care about
presidential pay levels and respond, in aggregate, negatively to high
the White-Collar Nonprofit Sector: The Best Option or the Only Option?, 72 REV. ECON. &
STATS. 560, 564-65 (1990). For more general discussion of the importance of workplace
amenities in sorting workers into different jobs, including in the religious employer context,
see Jonah Gelbach et al., Passive Discrimination: When Does it Make Sense to Pay Too
Little?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 801-22 (2009).
119 If nonprofit employees substitute warm glow for salary, as others have suggested, see
Henderson & Malani, supra note 10, at 583-84, they are in effect donors to the firm and
should be sensitive to executive pay in the same way. See Caers et al., supra note 11, at 3940 (suggesting that donor outrage could constrain executive pay). Hansmann, supra note 10,
at 843-68, suggests that all purchasers of services from a firm whose product is difficult to
monitor would be suspicious of managerial rent extraction. Our argument, though, is that
some customers are only purchasing goods or services, while others are also purchasing
warm glow. See Shaviro, supra note 108, at 1003-04 (suggesting that providing warm glow
is important for only some of the firms whose outputs are difficult to verify). Hansmann
himself notes that hospitals likely do not fit into his framework, and are classified as
nonprofits for “historical” and tax-related reasons. Hansmann, supra note 10, at 866-68.
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compensation. In other words, donor sensitivity is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the proposition that dependence on current donations
dampens pay levels. It is not obvious that the aggregate donor response to high
compensation would be to withhold or moderate contributions. Some donors
may be indifferent to president compensation. Other donors may view high
executive pay levels as a signal of quality that justifies their support. But still
other donors may view high compensation levels as waste, a signal of poor
governance, or an indication that the institution is already flush with funds.
Only in these latter cases would one expect a negative association between pay
and donation levels, and the existence of such an association would depend on
the latter effect outweighing any positive association between pay and
donations. Based on anecdotal evidence and analogous evidence from the
public company sector,120 we expect a negative association between pay and
donations to dominate.
3.

Unionization

Other factors may be present in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors but
may have differing effects on the outrage constraint in the two sectors. For
example, we would expect unionized employees to be more effective critics of
high college or university president pay than non-unionized, generally less
well-organized employees.121 Moreover, unionized employees may provide a
more effective voice at nonprofit organizations than at for-profit companies,
because nonprofit managers will have greater difficulty in assigning
responsibility for pay levels to market forces. If so, the disciplining effect of
unionization may be more discernible in the nonprofit sector.
4.

Institution-Specific Factors

Although the factors discussed above lead us to think that private colleges
120

Although the view is not unanimous, there is evidence in the public company realm
that shareholders take a dim view of high executive pay. See Marinilka B. Kimbro &
Danielle Xu, Shareholders Have a Say on Executive Compensation: Evidence from Say-onPay in the United States 4 (April 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2209936 (finding that negative “say-onpay” votes are associated with high levels of executive pay). Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling
find that the unexpectedly overwhelming House passage of mandatory “say-on-pay”
shareholder voting in 2007 resulted in a positive market reaction at firms with high
abnormal CEO pay levels, suggesting that the discipline created by say-on-pay was
welcome. Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does it Create Value?,
46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 299 (2011).
121 On the general role of employees as potential checks on managerial rent-seeking, see
Caers et al., supra note 11, at 40-41, and Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 11, at 321.
We find some correlation between president pay and mean faculty compensation, see infra
Table A2, which could support a theory that employees help to constrain managerial pay at
close to their own compensation levels. But the correlation could also be due to cross-school
differences in prestige, wealth, and local costs of living and amenities.
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and universities should provide a fertile laboratory for the study of managerial
power and the outrage constraint, other features of the sector may make it more
difficult for us to find strong evidence. In some cases, institution-specific
factors, such as particularly active press coverage, may swamp the impact of
donors, unionization, or religious affiliation. All else equal, trustees who
anticipate widespread coverage of their pay decisions are likely to feel more
constrained in awarding compensation than trustees who expect that their
decision will fly under the radar. Also, while university president pay has
grown substantially in recent years, the growth and diversity in pay does not
match that of the for-profit sector. Part of the explanation may lie in a
difference in technology. Without equity compensation, it is unlikely that
public company executive pay would have grown to present levels. This is not
to suggest that there is inadequate variation to study university president pay,
but only that the signal to noise ratio may be somewhat lower in this sector.
III. PRIVATE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT PAY: DATA AND
ANALYSIS
In this Part, we examine about a decade’s worth of data on the compensation
of university presidents, donations to schools, other sources of revenue,
expenditures, measures of quality, and a variety of other variables that could
affect compensation. We find evidence consistent with the idea that an outrage
constraint plays a role in determining university president pay. Although this
evidence is consistent with the theory discussed in Part II, the evidence we
provide, as is typical with work of this sort, does not enable us to make bold
statements about causation.122
A.

Sources of Data

We explore the compensation of presidents of private colleges and
universities with a sample comprising the 341 colleges and universities that
appear both in annual “Private Universities” reports on president pay from the
Chronicle of Higher Education (“CHE”), and in the institutional data compiled
by the National Center for Education Statistics (“NCES”) for each of the

122

The problem, in a word, is “endogeneity.” Endogeneity is a statistician’s term for the
possibility that the direction of causation assumed by the statistical model is incorrect;
technically, it describes any situation in which the measured variable is correlated with the
estimated errors. WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 11 (6th ed. 2008). This may
be the result of the dependent variable—the outcome that is being predicted—in fact
causing the factors we are using to analyze it. An example would be trying to predict why
the sun rises, and concluding that it is caused in part by roosters crowing; there is a strong
correlation, but our researcher has the causation story backwards. Another form of
endogeneity can result from omitting a variable from the model that jointly causes both the
dependent variable and the explanatory variable. An example could be a researcher
observing a correlation between SAT scores and salary and concluding that employers pay
high scorers more; in fact, both are likely related to underlying intelligence or social capital.
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eleven years between 1997 and 2008.123 The CHE report compiles salary and
other compensation data by drawing on tax return information filed by each
school. NCES is a division of the U.S. Department of Education that has as its
mission the collection and public distribution of information about institutions
of higher education.124 For interested readers, we set out summary data and
additional details about the construction of our data set in a Methodological
Appendix below.
Average total reported compensation of the presidents in our sample was
$365,000 in 2007 dollars—that is, after adjusting for inflation. This average,
however, masks a significant upward trend in pay levels across the period as
portrayed in Figure 1a.125

123 Although our study focuses on the period 1997 to 2008, we use lagged data for some
variables.
Our data derive from three main sources. President salaries and other compensation come
from the annual compilation by CHE. CHE’s figures in turn were harvested from Form 990
tax returns filed by the respective organizations. Most other institution-level data, including
religious affiliation, were downloaded from NCES. NCES derives its data from regulatory
filings required by the U.S. Department of Education. We obtained each school’s
fundraising costs, as well as other data used in our instrumental-variable regressions, by
matching NCES data with corresponding university tax return information from the
National Center on Charitable Statistics. In addition, we hand-collected unionization and
U.S. News & World Report ranking information for each school, as well as some
demographic data on presidents, such as each individual’s tenure in office. We deflated all
dollar amounts to real values using chained consumer price index.
124 About
Us, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, archived at
http://perma.cc/Y23G-SZA6 (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
125 College and university presidents receiving no reported compensation are excluded
from the data presented in Figure 1a.

2014]

NONPROFIT EXECUTIVE PAY

1909

Figure 1a
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Existing Evidence on College and University President Pay

Before launching into our own analyses, it is worth briefly reviewing
previous work on private college and university president pay. Prior studies
have established that the compensation of university presidents bears a fair
relationship to the demands of the job and the personal characteristics of the
president. Studies of the nonprofit sector generally find a relationship between
the size of an organization and the pay of its management.126 Several studies of
universities in particular similarly find that the size, complexity, and wealth of
an organization predict its president’s pay.127 A number of others find that
president pay is influenced by factors that could be described as measures of

126 Core et al., supra note 10, at 325-26; Hallock, supra note 9, at 392-96; CHARITY
NAVIGATOR, supra note 104, at 6. See also Jegers, supra note 10, at 151-53, for more
discussion of this connection.
127 Robin L. Bartlett & Olga Sorokina, Determinants of Presidential Pay at National
Liberal Arts Institutions, 29 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 53, 59-65 (2005); Ying Sophie Huang &
Carl R. Chen, Are College Chief Executives Paid Like Corporate CEOs or Bureaucrats?, 45
APPLIED ECON. 3035, 3036 (2013); Tang et al., supra note 58, at 411.
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success, such as selectivity, rankings, and peer assessments, though other
authors find no evidence of “pay for performance.”128 More experienced
managers do earn more in studies that examine the effect of experience on
pay.129
Evidence on the questions we explore here is scant. The most similar prior
effort is by Sharon Oster, who found that a university’s ability to spend out of
endowment had no significant impact on presidents’ pay.130 Oster’s results are
difficult to rely on, though, because she studied only a small number of
universities, looked at only one year, and did not control for most of the other
factors affecting president pay we just noted.131 However, Oster did find some
relation between dependence on donations and compensation in a slightly
larger group of ninety-five nonprofits (only a handful of them educational
organizations), albeit with very limited institutional or personal-characteristic
controls.132
Two earlier papers looked for, and claimed to find evidence inconsistent
with, managerial power among nonprofits. We have already discussed the
efforts by Jobome, who studied a broad range of nonprofits in the United
Kingdom.133 In the university setting, Mitchell Langbert and Marc Fox report
that the 20% of the presidents in their sample who were hired from within the
university were paid less than their externally hired counterparts.134 They argue
that this evidence is inconsistent with the managerial power hypothesis
because internal hires “ought to have institution-specific human capital” and
“more extensive ties to the Boards of Trustees”—that is, greater managerial
power—but instead they earn less.135
We are unpersuaded by Langbert and Fox. Managerial power theorists in the
128 Those finding evidence of a positive correlation include Bartlett & Sorokina, supra
note 127, at 59-65; Huang & Chen, supra note 127, at 3036; Monks, supra note 113, at 34447; Olga V. Sorokina, Executive Compensation: The Case of Liberal Arts College
Presidents, 12 ISSUES POL. ECON., Aug. 2003, at [7-8]; Tang et al., supra note 58, at 411;
and Rajiv D. Banker et al., The Compensation of University Presidents: A Principal-Agent
Theory and Empirical Evidence 4 (July 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1444849. Those finding no link include
Ehrenberg et al., supra note 104, at 26, 29-34, and Peter Frumkin & Elizabeth K. Keating,
The Price of Doing Good: Executive Compensation in Nonprofit Organizations 277-80
(Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Working Paper No. 8, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=292253.
129 Bartlett & Sorokina, supra note 127, at 59-64.
130 Oster, supra note 101, at 214.
131 Id. at 212-14.
132 Id. at 211.
133 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
134 Mitchell Langbert & Marc Fox, The Compensation and Benefits of Private University
Presidents 13-14, 26-27 (Sept. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2089641.
135 Id. at 13-14.
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for-profit context point out that outside hires often have greater negotiating
leverage and must be paid a premium to leave their already-excellent jobs,
which explains why they will often earn more than inside candidates.136
Moreover, we would not expect internal hires, who are usually university
provosts or other lower-ranking university officials, to have much managerial
power because they do not have nearly the same ability to shape the board or
the opportunities to interact with it as do presidents. In addition, employees
signing their first contract with a charitable organization are exempt from IRS
rules limiting excessive compensation, supplying a potential tax reason for
outside hires to be paid more.137 Finally, we suspect that the Langbert and Fox
results may be driven in part by the fact that interim presidents are typically
internal hires and are paid less than permanent hires.
A few other studies also supply some relevant data. Ronald Ehrenberg and
his co-authors find some evidence that successful fundraising increases a
president’s compensation.138 Two studies examine the relationship between the
percent of alumni donating and pay, reaching somewhat contradictory results:
one finds a negative relationship, which is generally consistent with our
finding, while the other finds no effect.139
In a related project, whose technical details we leave for elsewhere, we
study the effect on donations of a natural experiment in which information
about presidential pay is made easier for donors to obtain for an essentially
random subset of presidents.140 We find strong evidence that donors react
negatively to news of high executive compensation: schools whose president is
revealed to be among the “top ten” most highly paid receive about $4.5 million
less in donations, on average.141 We also find some evidence that schools
respond to reduced donations by shifting revenues towards other sources. For
instance, we find that presidents whose pay is disclosed subsequently allow
enrollment to rise.142 In short, we find evidence that donors respond to high
president pay by reducing contributions.143 As a result, it is certainly plausible
that at schools where donations contribute relatively more to overall revenues,

136

Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power
and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 270
(2005). But see Murphy, supra note 19, at 854 (arguing that higher pay for outside hires is
inconsistent with managerial power hypothesis).
137 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(i) (2002).
138 Ehrenberg et al., supra note 104, at 29-30; Hallock, supra note 9, at 398.
139 Compare Sorokina, supra note 128, at [7-8] (no relation), with Langbert & Fox, supra
note 134, at 16 (weak negative relationship).
140 Brian D. Galle & David I. Walker, Sunshine, Stakeholders, and Executive Pay: A
Regression-Discontinuity Approach (Boston Coll. Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research Paper
No. 316, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2363013,.
141 Id. at 19-20.
142 Id. at 25.
143 Id. at 27-28.

1912

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1881

presidents and trustees would have a stronger incentive to hold down reported
compensation.
C. New Evidence on President Pay
Like the studies described above, we employ regression analysis techniques
that allow us to investigate the impact of various factors on pay, holding other
factors constant. The dependent variable in our analyses (that is, the outcome
we are measuring) is total reported compensation. We measure the importance
of stakeholder outrage for president compensation through three main
explanatory variables: the proportion of the university’s annual budget derived
from contributions and gifts, institutional religious affiliation, and faculty or
staff unionization. We control for the determinants of pay found to be
important in the earlier studies, including various measures of the size of the
institution, institutional quality, and tenure in office. Our sample, again, is a
panel of 341 schools taken over an eleven-year period, which allows us to
explore variation over time as well as variation from school to school.
The analyses present several empirical challenges. To begin, methods of
computing non-salary compensation vary between organizations, and, for
reasons that we discuss below, it is unlikely that the variation is random. Thus,
our results are best interpreted as measuring the determinants of reported,
rather than actual, compensation.144
Second, one of our primary variables of interest—the fraction of revenue
from donations—may be related to president pay in more than one way. As
explained above, dependence on gifts captures to some degree donors’
leverage over the organization and its managers, and therefore should be
negatively correlated with the organization’s preferences for higher pay.145
This negative association is suggested by theory, and previous studies provide
some support for it.146 However, as prior literature also reports, boards tend to
reward successful fundraisers.147 This positive correlation between pay and
donations may obscure the negative correlation the outrage theory predicts.
Given the two competing forces, one would expect the relationship between
donor dependence and pay to be non-linear. Over some ranges of
compensation, the outrage effect would dominate, producing a negative
association; over other ranges the fundraising effect would dominate,
producing a positive correlation.
We test for this non-linear relationship by creating a series of non-linear fit
plots—basically, graphs in which our computer was allowed but not required
144

We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use presidential salaries rather than
total reported compensation as the dependent variable in our analyses.
145 We obtain quantitatively similar results when using alternative measures of the
university’s dependence on gifts, such as gifts as a percentage of expenditures or gifts per
student.
146 Langbert & Fox, supra note 134, at 16; Oster, supra note 101, at 214.
147 Ehrenberg et al., supra note 104, at 29-30; Hallock, supra note 9, at 398.
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to draw a curve rather than a straight-line relationship. And, indeed, as
exemplified by the “u-shaped” curve in Figure 2, the combination of the two
effects results in the expected nonlinear relationship. Accordingly, we include
the square of the fraction of revenue from donations in our regressions to
capture the nonlinear effect.

150000

Deflated annual compensation
160000
170000
180000

190000

Figure 2: Real Annual Compensation vs. Fraction of Revenue from
Gifts
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Correctly identifying which factors are causing the results we measure
presents an additional challenge. Unobserved aspects of presidential ability,
such as strong leadership and fundraising skills, could simultaneously drive
both giving and presidential pay. Outside shocks to regional wealth or inflation
could also drive both giving and pay. Our primary solution to these problems,
as further described in the appendix, is to employ president “fixed effects” that
should control for unobservable variation in presidential ability and human
capital. Similarly, we employ state and year fixed effects to help account for
the impact of local economic factors. In any event, all of these relationships
would tend to produce a positive relationship between pay and donations. If we
observe a negative relationship, we can infer that it was not likely to have been
caused by these unmeasured factors; if anything, these factors would tend to
obscure the negative relationship we predict. We also employ a variety of other
econometric techniques to double-check the “robustness” of our result. These,
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too, are described in more detail in the appendix.
Table 1 summarizes our basic “ordinary least squares,” or “OLS,”
regression results; a more complete version of the table, including results for
various control variables, can be found in the appendix.148
Table 1: Effects of Donation-Dependence on Compensation
Variable
Coefficient
% gift
-0.752***
(-2.794)
% gift squared
1.021**
(2.060)
Relig. affil.
-0.420***
(-5.114)
Staff union
.051
(.90)
Net Tuition
0.116**
(2.003)
Gov’t grants
.00897
(.571)
Notes: **: significant at 5% level ***: significant at 1% level;
see Appendix for full results; coefficient reported with (z-score);
random-effects OLS regressions with state and year effects; errors
clustered by president; all regressors lagged one year.

Overall, we find some support for our hypotheses. We find two strong,
opposing effects of increasing donation-dependence on presidential pay. The
linear effect is negative, statistically significant, and economically substantial
in magnitude. For example, the coefficient of -.752 for the linear percent-gift
variable in our base “ordinary least squares” regression implies that a 1%
increase in a university’s dependence on gifts correlates with a .75% reduction
in compensation. Mean donor dependence in our sample is 17.7%, and a one
standard-deviation shift is about 19.0%. This implies that the linear effect on
average suppresses pay by about 27.6% for a president whose school is at the
68th percentile for donor dependence, and nearly 42% for those in the 95th
percentile.
At the same time, greater donations are also associated with higher pay; the
nonlinear effect was positive in sign, statistically significant, and modest in
size.149 As expected, we find no evidence that grants or tuition constrain

148

In order to provide a sense of the variation across religious and unaffiliated
universities, Table 1 reports the results of a “random effects” regression. As we show in the
Appendix, we obtain very similar results using several other, similar methodologies that do
not require the assumptions of the random effects model.
149 Although the coefficient on the nonlinear effect is larger, the overall impact is smaller
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reported presidential pay. Indeed, the sign of the coefficient on tuition is
positive and significant. Several possible explanations for this finding are
discussed below.
Turning to the other measures of outrage, we find significant constraints
only from religious affiliation.150 Our data confirm earlier results finding that
presidents of religiously affiliated institutions receive lower average
compensation151—about 42% less in our sample. Unionization has no
significant effect.
We did find significant results with the expected sign for a number of our
institutional and personal-characteristic controls. Schools with more resources
pay more, and presidents earn more the longer they are in office. President and
faculty salaries tend to move in the same direction, though no doubt some
portion of that correlation is due to simultaneous shocks to the academic labor
market.
D.

Interpreting the Empirical Results

As suggested above, our results are probably best understood as providing
evidence regarding the determinants and effects of reported, rather than actual,
compensation. To be sure, our confidence in the accuracy of the numbers is
bolstered by the fact that the compensation data are drawn from federal tax
returns and that willful misstatements are punishable with jail time.152 But
prior to 2009, when the IRS revised its guidelines for reporting non-cash
compensation, there were few established conventions for how organizations
should account for the present-year value of deferred or in-kind payments.153
CHE’s data for the 2009 academic year evince a larger fraction of
compensation in the form of benefits than we observe in our sample, which
includes data only through 2008.154 In light of the empirical evidence of
because the variation in the square of donation-dependence is much less than the variation in
donation-dependence. For example, a one-deviation increase in donation-dependence
squared correlated with a roughly $40,000 increase in pay.
150 We treat a college or university as religiously affiliated if they check the box to
indicate such an affiliation in their self-reporting to the Department of Education.
151 Oster, supra note 101, at 212, 214 (reporting lower pay at religious organizations and
religious universities, though the results reported for religious universities lack statistical
significance); Kent T. Saunders, Salary Study of College Presidents and Faculty: Are
Salaries for Institutions in the Council of Christian Colleges and Universities Different
From Other Private Institutions?, 2 CHRISTIAN BUS. ACAD. REV. 83, 85-88 (2007) (finding
that presidents of religiously affiliated colleges earned about $25,000 less than their peers
during the 2005 academic year, and that presidents at a small group of self-identified
Christian fundamentalist schools earned another $22,000 less).
152 I.R.C. § 7206 (2012).
153 See Kertz, supra note 9, at 865-66 (observing wide inconsistencies in compensation
reporting by charities); Julie L. Nicklin, Colleges Are Evasive About Presidents’ Benefits
Packages, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 24, 2000, at A28.
154 Benefits represented 22.7% of total compensation in CHE’s academic-year 2009 data,
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concealed pay in the for-profit context, it is reasonable to assume that
universities generally reported lower annual compensation where that was
possible within the existing rules.155
Our hypothesis further suggests that the degree of under-reporting was
likely not random. Arguably, concealment works to reduce outrage because the
average stakeholder rationally free rides on the efforts of others in acquiring
compensation information. When there is agency slack, boards of directors can
therefore respond to outrage constraints either through reductions in real pay or
reductions in reported pay. To avoid tax-fraud prosecution, the board can
camouflage pay by shifting cash compensation into other forms where
reporting rules are looser. For example, the former president of one top
research university was, according to its 2010 tax return, still collecting over
$100,000 per year for his past services, even while not retired and still earning
a separate salary for serving on its faculty.156 That expected cost was not
clearly reported during his time in office.157
Econometrically, the possibility that camouflage substitutes for real
reductions means that our results are not fully reliable as evidence of the
economic importance of compensation per se. If greater donor pressure creates
increased incentives to camouflage, we cannot tell whether the results we
observe reflect changes in real pay, changes in reporting practices, or some
combination.
However, from a policy perspective, outrage-induced shifts in pay design
and reported compensation may be as important as reductions in “real”
compensation. As Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker argue in the public company
context, compensation arrangements designed with camouflage in mind may
“fail to provide desirable incentives” and may even provide “perverse
incentives.”158 Whether donor pressure constrains actual compensation or
while comprising between 13.4 and 17.4% of compensation over the period of our sample.
155 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 795-834 (providing examples of public
company pay practices consistent with the managerial power view); Bebchuk & Jackson,
supra note 17, at 832-51 (public company pensions); Walker, supra note 42 (stock option
backdating); see also Ehrenberg et al., supra note 104, at 30 (reporting that universities may
use deferred compensation because it is less “visible”).
156 President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2010 Form 990, I.R.S. (2011), available at
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/042/042103580/042103580_201106_990.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3888-ZWBN.
157 Harvard’s tax return for 2006 did disclose that its then-departing President would be
paid “miscellaneous” expenses, loan benefits, and a future award totaling “less than one
year’s salary at the time of resignation.” President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2006
Form
990,
I.R.S.
(2008)
(compensation
explanation),
available
at
http://207.153.189.83/EINS/042103580/042103580_2006_046C7DDD.PDF, archived at
http://perma.cc/XP4U-AWGL. The return also notes that the value of the president’s free
housing is not included in the reported compensation figure. Id.
158 Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 756-57; see also Emmanuel Saez et al., The
Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J.
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instead only distorts the form in which pay is presented, we have provided
evidence that pressure from donor outrage changes agents’ behavior. Likewise,
evidence that reported compensation impacts donors’ willingness to support
the university is significant for policy and for university planning, even if
donors are not responding to fully accurate information.159
1.

Reliance on Current Donations

With that significant caveat in mind, our finding of a negative association
between president pay and the fraction of university revenue derived from
current donations is consistent with the idea that the prospect of donor outrage
would have a moderating influence on pay. This argument is buttressed by
evidence we provide elsewhere that donors care about and respond to president
pay levels.160
We find alternative possible explanations for our results less persuasive.161
As noted above, Langbert and Fox found a negative association between the
percent of alumni who donate and president pay, and one would expect these
two metrics—dependence on current donations and rate of alumni giving—to
be correlated.162 Langbert and Fox labeled their result counterintuitive, but
offered two explanations. They suggested it was “plausible” that the alumni
giving rate would be a proxy for a teaching orientation and that presidents of
teaching-oriented schools would be paid at a lower rate.163 We control for this
possibility using research grant funding awarded to each school, Carnegie
category (a descriptor for the entity’s primary mission, such as “research
university” or “liberal-arts college”), and U.S. News & World Report ranking,
and still find a negative influence of donation-dependence on pay. Second,
Langbert and Fox suggested that the alumni giving rate might reflect the level
of alumni involvement in governance, “which may . . . moderate
administrators’ salaries.”164 We agree. This latter view is consistent with the
outrage hypothesis.
It has been suggested to us that unobserved negative shocks to a university’s
fortunes, such as a major scandal, might provide an explanation for the
negative correlation we observe between pay and the fraction of revenue

ECON. LITERATURE 3, 6-18 (2010), for an argument in the tax context that what appear to be
second-order behavioral effects can have important efficiency consequences.
159 See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
161 Jobome suggests that organizations that are more dependent on donations may adopt
more conservative pay practices since donation levels may be volatile and these
organizations would wish to avoid high fixed compensation costs. Jobome, supra note 11, at
347. We doubt that this phenomenon would have much explanatory power in the university
setting, where tuition revenues provide a relatively stable revenue stream.
162 Langbert & Fox, supra note 134, at 16.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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coming from current donations. The theory would be that universities are
forced to pay a premium to a “fixer” president who will enter after a scandal
and that the scandal would also depress donations. This possibility seems
unlikely to explain our results. Major scandals are not common,165 and tests for
the influence of outliers showed little impact, suggesting that our results are
not caused by a few instances of scandal. This theory would also predict that, if
the scandal effect is big enough to drive our regression results, then first-year
presidents should on average receive a pay premium, but we find instead that
mean compensation increases with tenure in office. Finally, our results are
largely unchanged if we omit presidents who are in their last year.
We also interpret our results to support the presence not only of donor
outrage but also significant agency costs. We observe that donors with greater
leverage are apparently better able to hold down presidential pay. This implies
that donors with less leverage are paying more than they would prefer.
A slightly different interpretation may be that presidents find it especially
easy to draw on endowment earnings and tuition to pay themselves. Schools
with large endowment earnings and tuition revenue will tend to have a lower
dependence on donations, and so these two factors may help to explain the
correlations we find. If students and parents rationally free ride in their effort at
monitoring university executives, tuition dollars would be a less-constraining
source of funds than many others. Or, similarly, both tuition and high president
pay could be the result of high agency costs for the university’s principals.
Our findings on the relation between tuition and compensation therefore
lend some additional support to our agency-cost story. Again, we find a fairly
sizable, statistically significant correlation between tuition and president
pay.166 A 10% increase in pay is correlated with a 1% increase in tuition (net of
financial aid). That relationship is not simply a measure of available resources,
since we also control for total revenues and enrollment. We therefore believe
the most likely explanations are various forms of free riding. Admittedly,
though, a third story could be that tuition is or is perceived to be a measure of
institutional quality or consumer demand, such that both high pay and high
tuition are measures of presidential success. For example, we do find a modest
correlation between gross tuition (i.e., not net of financial aid) and membership
in upper-echelon U.S. News rankings in our sample.
Enrollments may also be evidence of agency costs. We find here,
unsurprisingly, that enrollment correlates with pay. In our parallel project we
find evidence that schools whose pay practices are subjected to more scrutiny
tend to increase enrollment, which in turn also increases revenues.167 One
interpretation of that sequence of events is that presidents are acting
165

Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors
of Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25 (2003).
166 Since we control for enrollment, our tuition findings effectively measure per-student
costs.
167 Galle & Walker, supra note 140, at 25.

2014]

NONPROFIT EXECUTIVE PAY

1919

defensively to protect their compensation. By shifting revenues away from
dependence on donors, the president may reduce constraints on her pay. A very
similar story would be that increasing the size and revenues of the school helps
the president to justify her high pay. A third possibility is that the school is
forced to turn to other funding to make up for shortfalls from donors. While
that would not be as straightforward a manipulation of school policies for
private gain, it would nonetheless represent another distortion caused by
executive compensation.
2.

Religious Affiliation

Consistent with the work of others,168 we show that presidents of institutions
with religious affiliations tend to be paid less than presidents of completely
secular schools. We argue that one explanation for this effect, consistent with
the managerial power theory, is that observer thresholds for what constitutes
outrageous compensation would be lower in the case of religiously affiliated
institutions. But our data do not allow us conclusively to test or reject other
plausible explanations for the association we observe, and it does seem likely
to us that self-selection and substitution of warm glow for cash compensation
would also contribute to this association. One test we do perform is to include
the combined effects of religious affiliation and years in office in our
regression. When we do that, we see that the initial discount for religiously
affiliated pay is about half that in our other regressions, and that the increment
for time in office is also smaller. This may somewhat favor the outrage
constraint hypothesis, in that it seems as though religious affiliation holds
down pay in part by reducing its rate of increase, rather than simply by
matching managers with lower demand for cash to institutions that pay less.
E.

An Agency Cost Explanation for the Time Trend Data

Time-series analysis of presidential pay also supports our agency cost story.
As shown in Figure 1a, average university president pay climbed steadily and
significantly between 1997 and 2008. It is difficult to imagine why the value of
individuals willing to serve as presidents would have increased by 50% over
this period. In fact, the compensation of public company CEOs—participating
in one alternative labor market—was relatively flat over this period, and the
risk of being fired from a public company CEO position increased, reducing
(somewhat) the attractiveness of these positions.169
So what does explain the upward trend in university president pay during
this decade? We cannot be certain and offer only suggestive statistical
evidence, but the trend is consistent with an agency cost explanation.

168

See supra note 151.
See Huang & Chen, supra note 127, at 3036, 3038-39 (explaining that public firm pay
grew by 2% annually while university president compensation grew by 8% annually in real
terms between 1997 and 2004 in their sample).
169
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We note first that average tuition dollars increased by about 40% gross and
26% net over the period that average pay increased by about 50%. We
suggested above that the positive association between tuition and pay might
reflect the fact that tuition dollars carry lower levels of monitoring and can
more easily be channeled into compensation.
Second, the final Intermediate Sanctions regulations were issued by the IRS
in January 2002. In order to create a rebuttable presumption that pay is
reasonable under these regulations, boards must show that they obtained and
relied on appropriate data in determining pay.170 The process through which
organizations collect and analyze pay data at peer institutions is known as
benchmarking.171 It is widely suspected that the advent of benchmarking led to
an upward spiral in pay levels at public companies.172 The use of
benchmarking to justify executive raises and option grants mitigated outrage.
Outrage was reduced when these pay packages were placed in the context of
pay packages received by peer executives and some of the responsibility for
pay levels could be shifted to compensation consultants who designed the
plans and opined on comparability.173 Moreover, as no board wants to admit
that its CEO is below average, boards typically target pay levels at between the
50th and 75th percentiles of peer compensation.174 As a result, pay levels tend
to ratchet upwards.
It is plausible that, given increased “free cash flow” in the form of increased
tuition dollars, increased use of benchmarking at private colleges and
universities, sparked by the implementation of the Intermediate Sanctions
regulations in 2002, contributed to greater year-on-year increases in mean
pay.175 Look again at the graph presented in Figure 1a and reproduced in
Figure 1b. Note that the slope of a line fitted to the top of these bars tilts
170

Treas. Reg. § 53-4958-6(a)(2) (2002).
For a theoretical overview, see Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, CEO Pay and the
Lake Wobegon Effect, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 280, 281-90 (2009).
172 Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups, and
Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 J. CORP. L. 487, 493 (2013). For recent
evidence, see IRRC INST. FOR CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, COMPENSATION PEER GROUPS AT
COMPANIES WITH HIGH PAY (2010); John Bizjak et al., Are All CEOs Above Average? An
Empirical Analysis of Compensation Peer Groups and Pay Design, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 538
(2011); Michael Faulkender & Jun Yang, Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition
of Compensation Peer Groups, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 257 (2010). But cf. Brian Cadman & Mary
Ellen Carter, Compensation Peer Groups and Their Relation with CEO Pay, J. MGMT.
ACCT. RESEARCH, Apr. 2014, at 57 (suggesting that their evidence supports a story in which
selection of peer firms is mostly determined by firm size, rather than an effort to ratchet up
pay).
173 Cf. Elson & Ferrere, supra note 172, at 518-19 (suggesting that peer comparisons
provide boards with mental “rule of thumb” that biases pay upwards).
174 Id. at 494-95.
175 See Frumkin & Clark, supra note 9, at 472 (offering this hypothesis); Manny, supra
note 68, at 736 (same).
171
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upwards around 2002. The benchmarking hypothesis is supported by a
regression analysis that includes peer university presidential salary information
and a “dummy” variable for years after 2001. These two variables are
interacted, and the interaction term is significant and positively associated with
president pay, suggesting that the compensation of peer presidents was a more
important factor in determining pay after the advent of the Intermediate
Sanctions regulations than before. To be sure, there are other possible
explanations for the uptick in pay levels post-2001, and we do not argue that
this analysis provides definitive evidence of the mechanism we suggest, but the
data is certainly consistent with the idea that agency costs and outrage play a
role in the determination of university president pay.
Figure 1b
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
A.

Implications for Tax Law and the Law of Nonprofit Organizations

The theory and evidence presented in this paper suggest that potential donor
outrage constrains the compensation of private college and university
presidents. Where donors have greater voice, reported pay is lower. We have
also documented a steady upward rise in average president compensation over
the decade preceding the recent financial crisis. Two questions follow: Is there
reason to be concerned about executive pay in this and other nonprofit sectors?
If so, what, if anything, can be done about it?
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Reasons for Concern

We may have shown that pay levels are higher than donors would prefer,
but that is not the same as saying that they are higher than society should want.
The situation is different than in the public company executive pay realm
where we, at least, are satisfied to conclude that the shareholders should be
treated as principals and that deviations from shareholder preferences should
be avoided.176 In the nonprofit sphere, the principal is less obvious. There are
numerous stakeholders—customers (here students), donors, employees—but
no obvious single class of principals for whom the trustees act as agents.
Nonetheless, in matters of executive pay, we believe that the preferences of
nonprofit donors are more likely to be aligned with the preferences of all of the
various stakeholders than are the preferences of the managers themselves. If
one believes that trustees do little more than balance executive appetites for
more pay against donor outrage, one is likely to conclude that pay at donorconstrained schools is more nearly optimal than at schools insulated from
donor pressures.177 If so, then the conventional wisdom among nonprofit
theorists, that principal-agent slack is pervasive in the sector, especially among
large, complex organizations,178 also extends to the pay-setting process. Our
conclusion, then, is that university president compensation is likely to be
suboptimally high at schools that are relatively insulated from donor oversight.
Still, why worry? Aren’t pay levels fairly modest when compared with public
company executive pay?
To be sure, the presidents of the schools in our sample earn much less than
the CEOs of Fortune 500 firms, whose multimillion dollar pay packages are
regularly lambasted in the news, but private colleges and universities generally
wouldn’t be included in the Fortune 500 if they were for-profit enterprises. In
terms of assets and revenues, the average private college or university more
176 We are joined in this view by commentators such as Lucian Bebchuk, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Reply, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1789 (2006);
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833,
850-51 (2005), but others would disagree. See, e.g., LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER
VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HURTS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND
THE PUBLIC (2012); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1744-51 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547,
574-92 (2003).
177 We cannot rule out the possibility, however, that better informed trustees tend to set
socially optimal pay levels when left to their own devices and that misinformed donors
depress pay to suboptimally low levels when they have sufficient leverage to make a
difference.
178 Edward L. Glaeser, Introduction to THE GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 1, 39 (Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2003); Frumkin & Clark, supra note 9, at
482; Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 10, at 782.
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closely resembles a small cap company, at best. In 2007, the mean salary of the
CEOs of the S&P Small Cap 600 was $540,000, and total mean compensation
was $2.3 million.179 Using that as a reference, mean reported 2007
compensation of our private college and university presidents of $455,000 is
not insignificant.
In any event, the absolute dollars at stake are only a small part of the picture.
The economic cost of excess compensation in this sector is likely to be much
larger. The potential outrage constraint associated with substantial revenue
from current contributions may distort executive decision-making.
Recognizing the outrage constraint associated with healthy current donations,
presidents may choose to suboptimally stress efforts to increase tuition and
attract government grants while at the same time de-emphasizing fundraising.
Less significantly from a societal welfare perspective, presidents may attempt
to camouflage compensation by shifting it into pensions, housing, foundationbased payments, and the like.180 Further, in addition to depressing donations,
high president pay levels may adversely affect the morale and productivity of
non-executive employees in this sector.181
2.

What Can Be Done to Improve Donor Oversight of Nonprofits?

If donor pressure does matter at least for some kinds of governance
decisions, regulators can take steps to improve the usefulness of donor
behavior. For example, nonprofit regulators with scarce resources—which, in
the United States, is all of them182—may prefer to focus their energies on
organizations that are less dependent on donors. Or they may give closer
attention to organizations where donations drop noticeably. Of course, that
suggestion assumes that donor pressure reduces rent-seeking by organization
managers, rather than simply increasing managers’ efforts to shroud their
excessive pay. Regulations whose goal is to affect actual outcomes should
ensure that disclosures reveal complete and accurate information about the
organization.183

179 In 2007, mean sales of S&P Small Cap 600 firms were $830 million and mean assets
were $1.3 billion. This compares to mean revenues of our sample of private colleges and
universities of $436 million and mean total assets of $1.4 billion. S&P Small Cap data
retrieved from Standard & Poor’s Compustat Execucomp data, accessed July 2013. See
Compustat, www.compustat.com (accessed July 2013).
180 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 17, at 832-51, for evidence in the for-profit
sector.
181 Cf. James D. Cox, Fair Pay for Chief Executive Officers, in LAW AND CLASS IN
AMERICA (Paul D. Carrington & Trina Jones eds., 2006) (reviewing evidence that larger
disparities between executive and rank-and-file compensation at public companies are
associated with greater employee turnover, poor morale, and lower productivity).
182 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 785 (8th ed. 2009).
183 As we have noted, a possible counterargument to our suggestion here is that donor
outrage is inefficient in some sense. But even then, we doubt that camouflage is the best
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Along these lines, recent revisions to the Form 990 Instructions, if followed
closely by nonprofits, should considerably limit organizations’ ability to
reduce reported compensation without also diminishing its actual value.184 For
example, the new instructions require the organization to calculate the actuarial
value of changes in a defined-benefit pension plan, and to report pensions and
other deferred payments even if not yet vested.185 So far, it is too early to fully
assess the changes’ impact. We would also recommend promulgation of rules
requiring accurate reporting of free housing and transportation, regardless of
whether those items are taxable as income for the president.
However, it is unclear to what extent the Form 990 Instructions provide
organizations with real incentives to report accurately. Failure to comply with
the Instructions has no consequences, except in the extreme case in which
managers and preparers are subject to fraud or abuse penalties.186 The IRS
could potentially provide stronger incentives to report if the new disclosure
rules were made part of the Intermediate Sanctions “safe harbor.” Again,
organizations and managers that follow certain procedures, such as requiring
CEO compensation to be set by independent board members after review of
relevant comparable salary information, are presumptively insulated from
statutory penalties for paying or authorizing excessive compensation.187
Anecdotal evidence, such as Guidestar’s prominent warnings about managerlevel Intermediate Sanctions penalties shown side-by-side with links for their
“comparables study” service,188 suggests that managers value the safe harbor,
as do our findings about the effect of the 2002 final Intermediate Sanctions

solution, since camouflage also creates the opportunity for rents on the part of stakeholders
who are not averse to high pay. Better and more transparent stakeholder democracy, among
other options, seem like better choices.
184 Form 990 is the annual tax return for nonprofit organizations. For more extended
discussion of the revisions and their governance implications, see Evelyn Brody, Sunshine
and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure as a Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. TAX
REV. 183, 197-200 (2012); James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit
Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 564-78 (2010). For commentary
calling for increased use of Form 990 as an important regulatory tool, see Linda Sugin,
Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience into
Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 924-27 (2007). For skepticism of the project, see
Fishman, supra, at 558-88; Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose is Not Good for
the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 1996-2007
(2007).
185 IRS, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME
TAX 30 (2012), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/5MKV-LJKT.
186 Id. at 7.
187 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2002).
188
See Nonprofit Compensation Solutions: Why Nonprofit Compensation Research
Matters,
GuideStar,
http://www.guidestar.org/rxg/products/nonprofit-compensationsolutions/index.aspx, http://perma.cc/U5YL-DZWS (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
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regulations.
Therefore, we propose making clear, public, and contemporaneous
disclosure of the terms of each contract, along with valuations of the
reasonably expected costs of the contract terms computed along the lines of the
revised 990 Instructions, a requirement of the safe harbor. For instance, a
university might post prominently the actual employment agreement it signs
with its president, together with calculations of the expected cost of each
item.189 That could help ensure that donor pressure is directed toward the
actual substance of each contract, not its reporting.190 In related work, we find
that delays in reporting appear to result in delays in donor behavior, so
contemporaneous disclosure is vital.191 As for the existing safe harbor
provisions, while our evidence does not conclusively show that they have
driven up pay, we think at a minimum they should be carefully reconsidered.
Although we think this proposal is modest, for those concerned about the
impact of uniform, inflexible federal law on the space available for innovation
in nonprofit governance, we also suggest changes to default state rules. As we
noted earlier, state law prohibits nonprofits from distributing profit in the form
of “unreasonable” compensation, but judicial practice is to be exceptionally
deferential to board decisions about what is a reasonable compensation
package.192 Judicial deference rests on the “business judgment rule,” which
reflects an assumption that boards are better informed and better able to
manage the organization than most judges.193 Managerial power, however,
erodes the basis for the business judgment rule. In the presence of managerial
power, compensation awards are not based wholly on the considered expert
decisions of the board, but instead reflect in large measure the manager’s own
judgment about what she should be paid.
We therefore propose that state law should set up a default rule under which
compensation awards can be reviewed as though they were self-dealing
transactions. That is, since the manager’s pay is set by someone who has a
stake in the outcome (i.e., the manager herself), judges should review those
determinations much more closely and carefully than they would otherwise.

189

We are grateful to Mary Bilder for this suggestion.
An alternative approach would be to increase monitoring of nonprofit executive
employment contracts and practices. For example, Geoffrey Manne has proposed that
nonprofit organizations hire private for-profit monitoring firms that would be granted the
contractual right to sue for breach of fiduciary duty, with monitors’ profit objective and
reputational constraints leading to efficient monitoring. Manne, supra note 10, at 252-64.
This model may be in some disrepute following the apparent failures of credit rating
agencies to avert the 2007 credit crisis, though Manne’s proposal would give rather more
power to monitors than the rating agencies held.
191 See Galle & Walker, supra note 140, at 24.
192 WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 250 (3d ed. 2009).
193 Id.
190
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Organizations able to craft alternative governance structures to deal with
managerial self-dealing could opt out of the rule, but we suggest that they be
required to disclose that fact prominently to donors. In that way, donors could
choose which set of compensation rules they believed best protected their
interests, creating a market for the most efficient rule.
Of course, if organizations believed our proposal was the best policy, they
could amend their bylaws tomorrow to adopt it. We suggest that our rule be the
default, however, because it is aimed mostly at protecting a diffuse group of
donors and other stakeholders against the concentrated and already-entrenched
interests of management. That is, we would require nonprofits to act to opt out
of our proposal, rather than having to overcome the burden of inertia to opt in.
Given the collective-action problems that face the stakeholders in such a
contest, we agree with Bebchuk and Robert Jackson’s argument (in a parallel
for-profit context) that law should stack the deck in favor of the
stakeholders.194
B.

Implications for the Managerial Power Theory of the Executive PaySetting Process

As discussed above, to date, researchers focused on public company
executive pay have not found unequivocal proof that outrage constrains
compensation. Prior evidence has generally been circumstantial; although the
fact that boards of directors seem to take great pains to diminish the ease with
which other stakeholders can add up total pay is highly suggestive,
commentators have suggested pro-efficiency explanations for many of these
“hidden” pay structures.195 In contrast, here we find straightforward evidence
that dependence on donors puts pressure on universities to reduce reported
presidential compensation, and elsewhere we find that contributor displeasure
at high reported compensation is registered through lower donations.196 We
also find evidence consistent with the outrage constraint being set at a lower
level at institutions with religious affiliations.
However, even if one views our evidence as supporting the existence of an
outrage constraint at nonprofit institutions, can we extrapolate to the for-profit
sector? In other words, have we found evidence of a general phenomenon or a
phenomenon specific to the nonprofit universe? To be sure, donors to
universities are a different kind of stakeholder than shareholders in a firm. But
the differences may be smaller than they appear at first glance. In both cases,
these constituencies are “represented” by a board of directors that, for the
reasons discussed above, may be disinclined or unable to negotiate vigorously
with their chief executives. At the very top, there is a similarity of structure
194

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 103-04 (2010).
195 E.g., Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New
Optimal Contracting Theories, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 486, 494 (2009).
196 See Galle & Walker, supra note 140.
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and a similarity in agency problems.
Moreover, prior research suggests that, just as charitable contributors are
motivated in part by their emotional connection to their charity,197 so too,
many shareholders have preferences for “sustainable” or “no sweat” firms, or
other markers of their ideological preferences.198 Firms may donate to charity
and participate in politics in part to shape their image for investors, employees,
and customers.199 In other words, both ideology and return on investment are
part of the utility function for both nonprofit and for-profit stakeholders.
Admittedly, universities are also subject to legal limits on pay that do not
bind most for-profit firms. Perhaps the responsiveness of university executive
pay to donors could reflect fears that donor ire would trigger IRS scrutiny.
That story is consistent with some of the results reported here, but would not
explain evidence detailed elsewhere that donors themselves respond to
compensation news.200
In sum, we believe the agency problems in the two spheres are sufficiently
similar that the evidence provided here of outrage constraining college and
university president compensation supports the hypothesis that outrage
constrains pay in the public company sector. This conclusion should provide
some comfort for those advocating additional transparency and shareholder
voice in that sphere that reducing the agency problem is likely to improve
executive compensation practices.201
CONCLUSION
This Article provides evidence suggesting that greater reliance on
contributions as a source of funding puts downward pressure on the reported
compensation of presidents of private colleges and universities and that the
compensation of presidents of institutions with religious affiliations are lower
than those of peers at wholly secular schools. These results lend support to the
theoretical suggestion that stakeholder outrage may constrain executive pay
and may require some updating of the conventional wisdom that investments in

197 See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare
and Policy Analysis with Nonstandard Decision-Makers, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND
ITS APPLICATIONS 7, 62-65 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007).
198 See John L. Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially Responsible
Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
946 (2007); see also Rodrigues, supra note 10, at 1287-88 (comparing social meaning of
participation in nonprofit and for-profit firms).
199 Henderson & Malani, supra note 10, at 577-81. But see Roy Schapira, Corporate
Philanthropy as Signaling and Co-Optation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1889, 1900-18 (2012)
(suggesting that evidence for this story is unclear, and offering alternatives such as
possibility that corporate philanthropy is intended as a costly signal of financial strength).
200 See Galle & Walker, supra note 140.
201 Cf. Murphy, supra note 19, at 855 (“Outrage costs are critical to the [Bebchuk, Fried,
and Walker] analysis….”).
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monitoring nonprofit pay are wasteful. For example, skyrocketing tuition
remains a major social problem, and our results suggest that university
president pay dynamics could well be a contributing factor. Before embarking
on wholesale regulation of higher education, reformers may wish to consider
whether modestly tweaking the incentives of nonprofit executives could
achieve similar goals.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
A.

Data

As noted in the main text, our sample comprised all organizations appearing
in both the CHE and NCES data for the years 1997 through 2008. Three
hundred and forty-one institutions met these criteria. Although there is some
chance that limiting the sample only to universities that appear for nine
consecutive years could introduce a “survivor bias,” including schools that
entered or exited the group midstream is more problematic. Start-up
organizations, or those on the edge of collapse, may differ significantly in their
organizational dynamic from the typical, long-standing and stable entities that
make up most of the sample and about which we are primarily interested. Our
sample extends back as far as NCES data permit for our variables of interest,
and terminates at 2008 to avoid changes in compensation reporting rules, as
well as the potentially confounding effects of a severe recession on charitable
giving.
We also drop select observations within the sample to account for the
limitations of our data. We omit from our analyses observations in which the
reported salary of the president was zero. In all cases, as best we can tell, these
observations can be explained by the fact that the president in question belongs
to a religious order whose members forswear material wealth. In many
instances, the president’s order is reimbursed for his or her services, but the
precise amount cannot be discerned.202 We also omit cases in which more than
one individual served as president of an institution in a single year. The
Chronicle’s data do not make clear whether the figures reported for partial-year
service represent annualized or actual compensation, leaving us unable to
determine the correct amount to include. Moreover, compensation provided in
transitional years may not be representative of steady-state pay levels.
Our key variables and mean levels for each (in 2007 dollars) are reported in
Table A1 below. Almost 18% of university revenue over this period was
derived from gifts. Staff was unionized at 19% of these schools. Forty-six
percent of schools are reported as having a religious affiliation.

202 For example, the 2009 Form 990 for Boston College reports that the university paid
over $5 million to the Society of Jesus in return for services rendered to BC by members of
the order. But the return does not separately identify how much was paid for each individual
employee.
As best we can tell, universities that pay their leaders meaningful salaries do not also
compensate the leaders’ clerical order for their services.
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Observations

% of Revenue from Gifts
2990
Annual Gifts
2990
Full-time Equivalent Enrollment 2991
F/T Execs. per 100 FTE Students 2969
Fundraising
2641
Graduation Rate
2128
Gross Assets
2991
Hospital? (Indicator)
2136
Liabilities
2991
Mean Faculty Salary
2689
Reported Pres. Benefits
3565
Reported Pres. Salary
3578
Revenues – All Sources
2991
Revenues from Tuition
2991
Revenues from Grants
2919
Return on Investment
2987
Religious Affiliation? (Indicator) 3620
President’s Years in Office
3620
SAT – 75th %ile
2263
Staff Unionization (Indicator)
2811
Total Reported Pres. Compensation 3336

Mean

Std. Dev.

.177
39984
4808.47
2.84
9996
.69
1191360
.05
310080
71.27
53.59
286.88
322320
116484
40596
67728
.46
7.30
1293
.19
364.96

.190
91596
4646.90
2.19
22440
.16
3814800
.21
1446360
15.87
88.96
180.76
756840
139218
121788
359040
.50
6.41
125.3
.39
214.20

Note: All dollar figures reported in thousands of 2007 dollars.

B.

Determinants of Pay

As described in the main text, to mitigate endogeneity concerns, we employ
president fixed effects and other measures of presidential human capital.203 A
potential complication, however, is that presidential pay can also affect
donations, implying that regressors derived from total contributions could be
correlated with lags of our dependent variable. We would argue that most of
this relationship can be attributed to individual characteristics of the president
already controlled for in the regression, such as fundraising prowess and tenure
in office. However, to account for the possibility that past shocks to pay may
have been due to luck or other factors not unique to the president, we also
present separately a regression in which we control for lagged

203

Of course, using presidents rather than universities as our panel variable means that
we cannot control for unobserved university characteristics, but we believe that unlike
human capital, most of the important pay-determining variation in institutions is already
measured in our other data.
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compensation.204 Although generally system GMM is more efficient than
alternatives such as Hausman-Taylor, to capture estimates of the timeinvarying variables, we estimate a Hausman-Taylor regression in which we
treat percent gifts and percent gifts squared as endogenous to the president
fixed effects.205 We used Schaffer & Stillman’s “xtoverid” Stata routine to
obtain cluster-robust standard errors for the Hausman-Taylor regressions.
We also include a vector of control variables, many inspired by prior
literature. As we described in Part III.B above, researchers have found that
organizational size, complexity, and status influence presidents’ pay, so we
control for those factors using total revenues, total full-time equivalent
enrollment, total assets, size of the faculty, faculty to full-time enrolled student
ratio, faculty mean salary, whether the university has a teaching hospital, U.S.
News and World Report ranking,206 and 75th percentile SAT scores for the
entering first-year class.207 To account for the possibility that executive salaries
are influenced by peer compensation, we additionally include the mean total
compensation in the sample.
In addition to president fixed effects, we attempt to account for variations in
the quality of each president in several other ways. Although outcome
measures are notoriously difficult to identify in nonprofit settings, we include
return on assets and graduation rate as approximations of the president’s
success at managing the budget and ensuring student success. Since presidents
likely develop fundraising connections and learn from experience, we also
hand-collected and included each president’s tenure in office.
To account for differences in organizational focus and mission, we include a
set of indicator variables for each of the major Carnegie Institution categories,
such as “research university” and “liberal-arts college.” We also include a full
set of state and year fixed effects (and, in unreported results, university
effects),208 which we expect to account for any variations in macroeconomic
factors, the tax-price of giving, or major regulatory differences across time and
204

We obtain similar results controlling only for first or for both first and second lags of
compensation.
205 When we double-check the Hausman-Taylor regressions using system GMM
regression, we obtain similar coefficients to our reported results, but imprecisely estimated.
Because system GMM relies on first differences, it does not allow us to control effectively
for invarying, slightly varying, or constantly varying data, which may account for the loss of
precision.
206 We control for U.S. News rankings using indicator variables for U.S. News tiers in
each of the research university and liberal arts college undergraduate hierarchies. Unranked
schools were coded as “third tier.” U.S. News used a different reporting methodology for the
2002 academic year; regressions including U.S. News ranking omit data from that year.
Including 2002 but omitting U.S. News ranking does not change our results.
207 SAT scores and U.S. News rankings are highly correlated. Unsurprisingly, omitting
one tends to produce considerably more significant results for the other. Our main outcomes
are robust to including only one of the two.
208 Our results are similar but less precise when university effects are included.
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institutions. In combination with faculty average salary, state and year effects
should also effectively control for any variations in the local cost of living.
Finally, as Olga Sorokina did in her analysis,209 we employ lags of all of our
regressors. Presidential salaries are set in advance of the academic year. The
factors that determine compensation should logically be those prevailing at that
time. Although of course there is usually a strong correlation between most
regressors and their lags, such that other studies using same-year data are likely
still largely reliable, we believe our measures are more precise.
Our main results are reported in Table A2, below. Although results were
often more precisely estimated in levels, we report in log-log form to facilitate
interpretation and to account for the skewness of some variables. For ease of
reading, we omit state, year, and Carnegie-category effects and most
insignificant controls. Column 2 presents results from a fixed-effects (“FE”)
regression. To give some sense of the impact of cross-sectional variation, we
also report, in Columns 1 and 3, results from random effects (“RE”) and
Hausman-Taylor (“HT”) regressions, respectively. As noted below, we doublecheck the RE results using methods that do not require the unrealistic
assumptions underlying RE.
As we report in the main text, all three methods suggest an economically
and statistically significant relation between compensation and dependence on
donations. We also find in cross-sectional analyses that religiously-affiliated
schools pay about 42% less; again, we omit presidents who work for free, so
this represents the difference between salaried presidents at the two groups of
institutions. Compensation is correlated with increases in net tuition, with a
coefficient of about .1 across all the specifications, though in the fixed effects
regression the effect is significant only at about the 85% level.

209

Sorokina, supra note 128, at 4.
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Table A2
(1)

(2)

(3)

VARIABLES

RE

FE

HT

% revenue from gifts

-0.752***
(-2.794)
1.021**
(2.060)
-0.420***
(-5.114)
0.116**
(2.003)
.00897
(.571)
0.0254
(0.494)
0.0673
(1.007)
0.0166*
(1.951)
-0.00466
(-0.354)
-0.00607
(-0.142)
0.151**
(2.303)
0.462**
(2.118)

-0.745***
(-2.718)
0.975*
(1.925)

0.0866
(1.453)
.00408
(.827)
0.0338
(0.570)
0.0275
(0.230)
0.0180**
(2.092)
-0.00422
(-0.298)
0.0234
(0.445)
0.118
(1.360)
0.504**
(2.255)

-0.819***
(-2.860)
1.154**
(2.065)
-0.411***
(-6.062)
0.108**
(2.424)
.00634
(.605)
0.0111
(0.218)
0.0785*
(1.768)
0.0166**
(2.355)
-0.00500
(-0.393)
-.007
(-.22)
0.159***
(2.892)
0.461**
(2.574)

0.345**
(2.513)
.456

0.226
(1.456)
0.254

% revenue from gifts sq.
Religious Affiliation
Net tuition
Gov’t grants
Total revenues
Assets
Years in office
Investment return
Total liabilities
Enrollment
Mean other-president pay
Faculty avg salary
R-squared

0.347***
(2.838)

Notes: Column 1: random effects regression. Column 2: fixed effects regression. Column 3:
Hausman-Taylor regression. Coefficients reported with (z-score). Robust standard errors
clustered by president. All regressors are lagged one year. Regressions include controls for
75th-percentile SAT score, student:faculty ratio, graduation rate, and year fixed effects.
Columns 1 and 3 include Carnegie category and state fixed effects. *: statistically significant
at the 10% level; **: statistically significant at the 5% level; ***: statistically significant at
the 1% level. N: 2,198.
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Robustness Analysis

As an additional check, we also use 2SLS to include several different
instruments for donation-dependence. For example, we use state-level “tax
price of giving,” a measure of the total tax subsidy for charitable donations, as
an instrument for donations to each institution.210 In some specifications, we
also include, as a second instrument, fundraising expenditures, which are
strongly correlated with donations, but have no obvious causal connection to
executive compensation.211 In all cases, we use squares of the IV variables to
instrument for percent-gifts squared.
While our instrumental variable results are similar in sign to those reported,
their magnitude is large enough to raise questions about whether they are
meaningful. We obtain coefficients about seven to ten times larger than those
reported, bigger than any plausible relationship could be. Inflated coefficients
are commonly observed when there is some causal relationship between the
supposedly exogenous instruments and the dependent variable. Thus, we doubt
the 2SLS results provide much support for our findings.
Lastly on the robustness front, we recognize that our random-effects model
relies on an assumption that the individual president effects are uncorrelated
with our other regressors. As an additional check, we estimate our equation
using a population-averaged panel-data model, also known as a generalized
estimating equation or “GEE.”212 GEE does not require any assumptions about
the relationship between the individual effect and the other regressors, and for
our purposes its results can be interpreted similarly to OLS. We obtain
essentially identical results using either RE or GEE.

210

Our tax price data derive from computations described in Jon Bakija, Tax Policy and
Philanthropy: A Primer on the Empirical Evidence for the U.S. and Its Implications, SOCIAL
RESEARCH: AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY web app., June 2013, available at
http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/Bakija-Tax-Policy-and-Philanthropy-WebAppendix.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7QUR-P2W7. We are grateful to Bakija to
sharing his calculations with us.
211 Conceivably, a nonprofit executive could extract value from the nonprofit by
operating a fundraising firm and then contracting with the firm to do fundraising for the
nonprofit. But most universities have policies that prohibit presidents from such extensive
outside activity, and obvious conflicts of interest at that level would seldom escape close
scrutiny. In addition, it might be argued that, to the extent the president is involved in
fundraising, a portion of the university’s reported fundraising costs may include a fraction of
the president’s salary. Average fundraising expenditures in our sample, however, were
orders of magnitude larger than average president pay; changes in president pay should have
no meaningful impact on reported fundraising.
212 See Joseph C. Gardiner et al., Fixed Effects, Random Effects, and GEE: What Are the
Differences?, 28 STAT. IN MED. 221, 227-39 (2009), for an overview of the tradeoffs
between the RE and GEE models.

